

JPRS-UMA-94-018

11 May 1994



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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Central Eurasia**

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***Military Affairs***

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## Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-94-018

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## ARMED FORCES

### Ministry Collegium Discusses Morale, Prestige Of Service

94UM0371A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
12 Apr 94 pp 1,3

[Article by Captain First Rank Vladimir Chupakhin: "Society Suffers From Lack of Spirituality—Best Remedy Is Patriotism: Notes From Session of Russian Defense Ministry Collegium"]

[Text] What a complex, unusually sensitive and unique organism the army is. Any sore point in our society or negative phenomenon there immediately appears in the military, and with double or even triple the intensity. The economic crisis is hard for everyone, but for military personnel, who are maintained exclusively at government expense, its consequences are especially grave. Discipline has slackened in the country, crime has become rampant, and these things cannot help but affect the strength of our military ranks.

But perhaps the most important issue today is what is happening in the spiritual or psychological area—the crisis of the state and national ideal, the loss of moral reference points in life, and much, much more. While for some people these things are no tragedy, if they can find refuge in the world of individualistic, consumer values, for military people, whose very vocation is founded on the idea of serving the Fatherland and on the idea of patriotism, to lose one's spiritual grounding is like having no weapons or ammunition in battle.

In this connection it is hardly surprising that military personnel are among the first who are sounding the alarm about an aggression being waged by the lack of spirituality, amorality, and all-permissiveness that we encounter left and right. It is not surprising that the Armed Forces and Ministry of Defense are increasingly often a source of impulses encouraging a rebirth, on a new basis, of the patriotic and unifying ideal and of effective and productive efforts to rear true civilians and defenders of the Motherland.

This theme was the focus of a session of the Russian Ministry of Defense Collegium held several days ago, as KRASNAYA ZVEZDA already reported. The agenda item was worded as follows: "On measures to strengthen military-patriotic education for servicemen and young people in support of the Russian Federation Armed Forces." But in the hall, besides military officials and chiefs of Main and Central Defense Ministry Directorates, one could also see Russian Minister of Culture Ye. Sidorov; Colonel-General G. Yashkin, retired, chairman of the Russian veterans organization; Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad; R. Bykov, the noted film-maker, and many other state and public figures and representatives of concerned organizations. This made it clear that the discussion would inevitably transcend purely departmental bounds and by no means touch on the "interests of the Armed Forces" alone.

And that is what happened. The introductory remarks by Russian Defense Minister General of the Army P. Grachev, followed by the report by Deputy Defense Minister Colonel-General V. Mironov, bluntly declared: "This situation cannot continue. Nihilism, lack of spirituality, and morale degeneration have reached an extreme point that poses a danger to both army and navy combat readiness and the security of society and the state. The following facts disclosed at the session caused a bitter sensation: In sociological surveys conducted among conscripts in a number of oblasts on whose territories the units of the Volga, Urals, and North Caucasus Military Districts are stationed, as well as in Moscow and Moscow Oblast, nearly 70 percent said military service was unnecessary, and more than 35 percent spoke of a readiness to emigrate from the Motherland. Every second conscript thinks that such concepts as military duty, honor, and patriotism are things of the past and no longer have any meaning.

The character of conscripts is extremely alarming. Drunkenness, drug abuse, and crime are on the rise. Almost every fifth young recruit has committed a legal offense or been taken to the police station, and nearly 10 percent have been convicted of crimes.

In view of all these things, the Army and Navy are definitely taking necessary measures. Everything possible is being done. Col-Gen Mironov cited a number of facts relating to every service arm and branch and showing how commanders and Army and Navy educators aren't giving up but are instead trying to work with the contingent now arriving in units and on ships and to get positive results nonetheless. But the main attention of both the keynote speaker and other colleagues who spoke was focused, not surprisingly, on shortcomings and untapped potential.

The need to improve cooperation with state and public organizations, patriotic associations, and the mass media was posed with particular urgency. It was pointed out that much in this regard has been lost, unfortunately. Ties with unit veterans, associations of Afghan war veterans, and other patriotic organizations are unraveling.

The educational role of the Russian Sports and Technical Defense Association has declined markedly. Many of its primary organizations are more involved in commerce than in the education of future soldiers.

The Russian Armed Forces have at their disposal a rather impressive array of assets for military-patriotic education. They include more than 500 officer houses and clubs, 400 military museums, 35 singing and dancing ensembles, six drama theaters, 800 orchestras, and library holdings of several million volumes. But this things need serious support. Every third officers house is in need of renovation. There is a shortage of funds to make video films and movies about the history of service



branches and units. Book holdings must be updated. There is almost no literature on the history of Russia and the Russian Army.

A study of the state of affairs in military commissariats in Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Samara, Tataria, Bashkiria, and a number of other parts of the country show that existing educational potential is being used poorly and that cooperation with government bodies and public organizations is weak. For example, of 246 military-patriotic clubs in Moscow only 14 remain, and of 1,400 museums and military valor rooms in secondary general-education schools only 514 are left. The situation is no better in other republics and oblasts.

Honor guards at memorable sites linked with the heroic history of the Fatherland have been eliminated almost everywhere. The Orlenok [Eaglet] and Zarnitsa [Summer Lightning] Games have become a thing of the past. Military sports camps have almost disappeared. Fitness programs for young people, like the Ready for Labor and Defense program, many of whose methods were adopted in other countries, including the United States, France, and Germany, have ceased to function.

The report and a number of speeches suggested that it is a serious mistake to abolish the system of elementary military training, which was hardly intended to militarize pupils' way of thinking and has greatly helped youths adjust to army life and master basic army skills.

And it is inappropriate that military-patriotic themes have largely disappeared from school textbooks, literature, movies, theater, and art. Unfortunately, the vacuum is being filled by a low-grade promotion of sex and violence. Age-old Russian values are being destroyed.

Yes, there are many, many problems, and they are extremely acute. But what can be done? How can the syndrome of destruction be overcome? How can the situation be rectified?

"We can talk a lot about forms and methods of patriotic education," said Colonel-General M. Kolesnikov, chief of the General Staff, in his speech. "But nothing is going to change unless we start with ourselves, with the patriotic education of officials."

He was seconded by R. Bykov. Today our government itself, the national leadership itself is in need of patriotic education, if you will. To be more precise, in need of a change of attitude toward this matter." The film director cited an incident that evoked a stir in the hall. He recounted how a request that an appropriate government agency help finance a movie about the 50th anniversary of the Great Victory brought the following answer: We can't help because "the military budget cannot be increased." This is the level of understanding of the problem, the level of thinking that, unfortunately, is very widespread even among senior officials.

"We have reached a point where people have even begun to be embarrassed by the term 'military-patriotic' education," said Deputy Defense Minister Colonel-General B. Gromov bitterly in his remarks. He called the attention of those present to the need to seriously improve efforts to instill in young people respect for national history and the achievements of Russian culture.

"We must pool our efforts!" was the main point of the speech by Russian Minister of Culture Ye. Sidorov. He said that the Ministry of Culture was prepared to cooperate closely with the Ministry of Defense in all initiatives aimed at the spiritual rebirth of society. In the minister's opinion, a good start would be worthy preparations for the 50th anniversary of the Great Victory and a fitting observance of that event.

Metropolitan Kirill also spoke about pooling efforts. In this connection, he characterized the cooperation agreement signed recently by Defense Minister General of the Army P. Grachev and Patriarch Aleksii II of Moscow and All Rus as extremely promising. This "agreement of intentions" of sorts is already operating and making headway in promoting the revival of Russian military traditions. But it is important, the clergyman stressed, to prevent the effort from becoming a short-lived campaign and to avoid excesses, as in a reported incident in one unit in which the following order was issued: "In honor of the observance of the Annunciation, I hereby order..."

Real deeds, not fanfare and declarations, are what is needed today. This was emphasized by many colleagues at the session. Any real efforts, no matter how small, to promote the revival of patriotic education must be supported. In particular, attention was called to steps taken by the commanders of the North Caucasus and Transbavkal Military Districts to support effective cooperation with the Cossack movement. In this region, almost 80 Cossack organizations are serving as sponsors for various units and taking part in educational work and efforts to solve social and consumer-service problems.

Or consider this example: Despite all difficulties, young sailors clubs in the Northern Fleet, young paratrooper clubs in the Moscow Military District, and young artillery crewmen clubs in St. Petersburg and Yekaterinburg have survived and are popular among young people. The same is true of patriotic and military-history associations attached to various units and higher educational institutions. This form of work encompasses more than 50,000 youths, and more than 3,000 servicemen have been enlisted in it.

Every effort must be made to publicize such examples and multiply them. Patriotic education enthusiasts must receive comprehensive assistance and support.

At the same time, it is clearly impossible to rely solely on someone's enthusiasm. The session leitmotif was the need for a carefully formulated and substantiated state policy on patriotic and military-patriotic education and on the development of appropriate federal programs

involving all branches of government, as well as representatives of science, culture, and public organizations.

This was also stressed by General of the Army P. Grachev in his closing remarks. He announced that the Ministry of Defense will propose an initiative to the government on launching a federal program to enhance the prestige of military service and to strengthen not only the prestige of the Armed Forces, but also the Russian state and the country's security.

As was pointed out, the collegium discussion is only a start, a kind of prologue to a tremendous amount of painstaking work to create in the new conditions a reliable and effective system to rear citizens, patriots, and defenders of the Motherland—a system that both society and the Armed Forces need very much.

## POLICY

### Ossetia State of Emergency Extended

94UM0374A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
6 Apr 94 p 1

[Unsigned RIA [Russian News Agency] article under the "Novosti" rubric: "State of Emergency in North Ossetia and Ingushetia Extended"]

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin has signed an Edict on Conduct of a State of Emergency in Parts of Territories in the North Ossetia Republic and the Ingush Republic.

Issuance of the edict is related to the tense situation lingering in a number of areas of the two republics, which are suffering acts of terrorism and violence and to the necessity for observing the 13 December 1993 RF [Russian Federation] Presidential Edict on Procedure for the Return of Refugees and Involuntary Migrants to Their Permanent Residences in the North Ossetia Republic and the Ingush Republic.

### Zhirinovskiy: Submariners Ready to Attack NATO Air Bases

AU0905153294 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian  
29 Apr 94 pp 51,52

[Interview with Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, by Srdjan Djuric in Moscow; date not given: "Support for our Christian Orthodox Brothers"]

[Text] The problem of former Yugoslavia and the agreement on civil reconciliation were topics that dominated the Russian political scene last week, judging at least from debates in the state Duma and media. On Friday, 22 April, in the Kremlin, President Boris Yeltsin summoned the leaders of the parliamentary factions, the representatives of the church, and government officials. At the meeting, where the draft of an agreement that, as

has been envisaged by economists, would soothe political disagreements, and prompt a harmonized Russia peacefully to develop further, Yeltsin's most vociferous opponent, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, took part.

Three months have passed since our last conversation on the premises of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR], a dilapidated old house on Stepenkiy Square. He arrived at the party's new headquarters in the Mir Hotel, next to the building of the former CEMA [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance], the current Duma, visibly exhausted by lengthy assembly debates and talks in the Kremlin. Beside the new LDPR headquarters, many things have changed since January. Among his closest aides, who are making a much more civilized impression now, there are almost no old faces. Although his attitudes remain the same, Zhirinovskiy appears to be more composed than before. He is lacking the severity that used to emanate from each movement, word, or look of his. It seems that he is even trying to wash his hands of some of his earlier uncontrolled statements.

"Our attitude has always been against any military intervention on any Serbian territory in the former Yugoslavia, particularly against any involvement by NATO," Zhirinovskiy says about the NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serb positions. "We are explicitly against it, and we have been saying this for four months now. I have said even today to our president that we ought to take a clear stance regarding the protection of our Christian Orthodox brothers in the Balkans and Yugoslavia," he says.

[Djuric] You said that if it came to air strikes against the Serb positions, cities of NATO member countries would have to pay the price. Recently it did come to air strikes against the Serbs....

[Zhirinovskiy] That is my personal position. We shall be urging our government to take the appropriate measures. When our delegations come back from Serbia, we shall propose that the Duma lifts the economic sanctions against Serbia. We are ready to exert further pressure on our government to take a firmer stance, to forbid any bombing of Serbian towns. We are sticking to that stance. However, we are an opposition party, rather than the executive body, so we shall be pursuing our policy in the future as well, and we shall not give up.

[Djuric] You were a vehement critic of the official Russian policy on the problem of former Yugoslavia. How do you assess the roles of the president and the foreign minister today?

[Zhirinovskiy] Their policy has started to change in the last two months. They have taken a stance closer to the Serbs, as much toward the United Nations as toward the Muslims and other participants in the Yugoslav conflict. However, we still consider their stance to be weak, and they should take a firmer one. We have demanded many times that the foreign minister be replaced. I also demanded this in the Duma last week, and yesterday as well, while today I said in the Kremlin that we ought to

have a different foreign policy, particularly with regard to the former Yugoslavia. I think that the wrong attitude of our diplomats is best illustrated by Kozyrev's completely unprofessional attitude. The role given to Churkin does not correspond to reality at all. And now the minister's deputy [Churkin] is behaving like an offended little girl.

The best and the only way is to lift the economic blockade against Serbia and Montenegro. One should start commercial exchanges, conclude military-political agreements, our army should be sent to Serbia, and only then will the final score be positive for Serbs. There is little use in the negotiations and conferences that Yeltsin is interceding for. So far all the conferences and all the negotiations have eventually collapsed, and the war has continued. Today I proposed to Yeltsin that we could accomplish peace in the Balkans by sending our troops in the region. We have considerable troops in Germany—300,000 soldiers and officers. We could send them to the Balkans, rather than back to Russia. In that way the issue would be solved, provided, of course, that the Serbian republics consented to this.

[Djuric] Aleksandr Rutskoy and Ruslan Khasbulatov have been released from prison thanks to your party's votes. Have there been any changes on the Russian political stage caused by their release?

[Zhirinovskiy] No, their release has not influenced the political situation in Russia at all. However, I think that, from the psychological point of view, the situation is much better if you do not have political prisoners. Khasbulatov has completely abandoned politics, and will not be engaged in it, or involved in any political activities. As for Rutskoy, he is resting. He is at home, and is not influencing political life in any way.

[Djuric] Your visits to Serbia and Montenegro have caused many controversies. It has been noticed that no officials received you....

[Zhirinovskiy] We went there on invitations by certain parties, associations, and movements. That was not a part of the program and was not necessary.... We simply visited our Serbian friends, and followed the program that they prepared. The basic intention was to visit different regions, and to make contacts with the local population. That was our first visit, and was highlighted by our participation at several big rallies—in Vukovar, Montenegro, and Herzegovina. We did what the program anticipated by our friends expected us to do. I see nothing peculiar in this.

If parliament invites us (our second delegation went to Serbia following an invitation from parliament, whereas even now our delegation is visiting parliament), we shall also go there. On 8 May we shall be there again, and everything depends on what sort of program is anticipated by those who invite us.

[Djuric] In Serbia much attention has been paid to your cooperation with the party led by Zeljko Raznjatovic

Arkan, as well as to the so-called secret Elipton weapon that you gave him. Why did you decide to cooperate with that particular man, and why did you give that mysterious weapon to him, rather than to somebody else?

[Zhirinovskiy] It is our military experts, our supporters, who were also there with us, who gave him the weapon. We just connected them with Arkan, and we have nothing against their exchange of experience or assistance aimed at improving the defense ability of Serbian territories. We have several naval officers, submarine commanders, who are ready even to deploy their submarines in the Adriatic Sea, and carry out attacks against the NATO air bases from which planes assigned to bomb Serb positions take off. That was the officers' personal initiative. We are a political party, and we do not take part in such activities. However, those officers are so eager to help, that, as far as I know, they already have a plan to carry out counterattacks against NATO bases.

[Djuric] Your visit to Zagreb had been announced for a long time. Why did you cancel it, and when will it eventually come about?

[Zhirinovskiy] In Zagreb, there is a dispute in the leadership. Some people want me to visit them, others are hesitant. Besides, I am waiting for public opinion to mature. As far as I know, for the time being there is no acceptable solution between the Serbs and Croats, and I would not like the Serbs to think that I want to make some agreements with the Croats. I have plenty of time. If it is their good will and desire, I shall visit them, but my policy remains unchanged—giving support to our Serbian Orthodox brothers.

[Djuric] The state Duma has been discussing the problem of former Yugoslavia for several days. What can be expected after the return of the delegation of the Duma that is now touring the former Yugoslav republics?

[Zhirinovskiy] The basic goal of our party is that our activities in parliament result in a decision to lift the sanctions, and in the government's undertaking concrete steps aimed at the improvement of the situation in the Balkans. We shall do anything that we are required to. We were told: If there had not been these latest events in Gorazde, in two weeks the sanctions would be lifted. That is what they are saying now. The fact is that even if there had not been those clashes, the sanctions would probably not have been lifted anyway. It is hard to judge how realistic the option was. But the tendency to speed up the possible lifting of the sanctions does exist.

[Djuric] You are saying that you were told that the sanctions might have been lifted. Do you think that the Serbs made a mistake by attacking Gorazde?

[Zhirinovskiy] I do not think so, and I cannot accuse anybody here. That is a matter for the Serbs. Still, our experts at the Foreign Ministry believe that if the events in Gorazde had not happened, the question of sanctions



would have been settled in the shortest possible time. That is what they are saying now, but, perhaps, they are simply deceiving us.

[Djuric] In addition to Arkan's party, which other Serbian political parties do you cooperate with? What sorts of cooperation do you exercise, if there is any cooperation?

[Zhirinovskiy] Our relations are the same with all the other parties. We do not interfere in the internal affairs of Serbia. When some parties invite us, we go there, and make contacts.... And whether we have any particular preferences — no, we do not! Those are internal affairs of Serbia. We have the same attitude toward each of Serbia's political parties.

### STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES

#### Plesetsk Commander Urges Merging All Missile, Space Forces

94P50140A Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian  
22 Apr 94 p 22

[KOMMERSANT correspondent Mikhail Kirtser report: "Russian Cosmodrome: Plesetsk Will Take on Baykonur's Programs, if Money Is Forthcoming"]

[Text] Yesterday KOMMERSANT correspondent Mikhail Kirtser returned from Arkhangelsk province, where the Russia's Plesetsk cosmodrome, which has for 30 years fulfilled exclusively military functions and which is officially known as a state test site, is located amidst the forests. For the first time, the command of the Strategic Missile Troops permitted Russian journalists to come here, showing them the latest Topol (SS-25) strategic missiles as well as an exercise by a missile regiment.

During the exercise the photojournalists simply implored the missile officers to erect an ICBM into the vertical position. But the soldiers explained that such a procedure is irreversible: A missile can assume combat position only with a "launch" command. The press decided not to insist. They were able to observe the movement of a column of missiles and support vehicles and the concealment of a launcher at its combat site in the forest. Then the KOMMERSANT correspondent visited the training center, where noncoms and officers are trained as service personnel.

The Plesetsk cosmodrome is an entire complex of the most various buildings and installations. The strategic mobile missile regiment, whose exercise the representatives of the press observed, is only a part of the whole. There are also launch sites, which are inevitably associated with Baykonur, which is now in a foreign country. True, they were not able to look into missile silos—their hatches can be opened only by means of a special mechanism (whose work would be "noticed" both by the press and by orbital spy satellites), but they were nonetheless able to touch a rail-based missile complex. (KOMMERSANT wrote about this adventure in February).

The true purpose of the invitation to the journalists became clear at the concluding press conference, which was conducted at the secret town of Mirnyy, next to the cosmodrome. The test site commander, Lieutenant-General Yuriy Zhuralev, declared that he thought it was incorrect to divide the country's missile forces into Strategic Missile Troops, Military-space Forces, and ABM Defense Forces. In his opinion, such a division only complicates command and control and increases upkeep expenses. The Lieutenant-General also declared that the test site's capabilities enable it, without no need for new equipment, not only to support the Strategic Missile Forces' combat readiness, but also to take on the civilian space programs from the Baykonur cosmodrome (the more so, in that Mirnyy has scientific establishments and intellectual potential which would permit Russian space technology to attain a high level of efficiency and reliability). There is only one problem—too little money.

#### Strategist Views Russian Nuclear Potential

PM0605121594 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI  
in Russian 5 May 94 p 6

[Part one of two-part article by Vasilii Krivokhizha, deputy director of the Russian Institute for Strategic Research: "Future of Russian Nuclear Potential"]

[Text] The Soviet leadership's political thinking, particularly as regards military-political strategy, used to be compared in the old days to studied chess gambits. The circumstances of the USSR's collapse and the rapid degradation of society call into question the correctness of this complimentary comparison—at any rate as regards the skills of many of the "chess players" of the perestroika period. The historians of the future, however, will as usual voice varying opinions about 20th century Russian history and about whether the last Soviet leadership had an inferiority complex or whether they were pioneering a new era, and so forth. What will be seen as history by the researchers of the future, for us increasingly boils down to the problem of survival. Consequently, as we encounter very urgent matters every day it does not seem out of place to attempt to sort out at least certain rules and the sense of the game in which Russia is a player in the nuclear arms sphere.

The current era of total change is, apart from anything else, also a time of radical change in geostrategic realities and ways of thinking. The speed and spontaneity of these changes are probably the reason why our so-called post-Soviet society is parting willingly (and even with unmitigated enthusiasm) from the state appurtenances that largely determined the USSR's status as a military "superpower." There is something irrational—though easily explained in terms of the systemic crisis in society and its revolutionary nihilism—in the fact that we are putting paid with equal measures of indifference ("we don't need that any more!") to the, in many respects controversial but nonetheless technically sophisticated,

"Buran" (and thus, in practice, to our entire "state-funded space effort"); to aircraft-carrying cruisers—and next it will be the turn of the entire oceangoing fleet; and to ABM defense and air-defense installations and strategic ground force groupings west of Smolensk and south of Sochi.

There is, however, a sphere of social and professional interests where the consequences of the possible changes should be analyzed with particular care and where discussions should be conducted by specialists in a constructive spirit without any interference from emotions and not necessarily in conjunction with other information such as, say, the examination of the START II Treaty by the new parliament or the adoption of a long-term program for military organizational development. It will be a question of the prospects for developing our strategic nuclear forces, which can quite justifiably be called the scepter in the double-headed eagle's claw.

It is time to recognize that behind the numerous discussions about the expediency of retaining, removing, or adopting certain weapons systems and their quantitative and qualitative parameters lies a principled and so fundamental question that people prefer not to consider it—will Russia be able under these conditions that are new to it to preserve its nuclear potential and in what form? It is no secret that a number of important components in the nuclear system that used to exist have been lost, and traditional problems such as, for instance, the no-first-use of nuclear weapons and the relationship between a retaliatory strike and a counterstrike are being reconsidered and reinterpreted. Thus, the question of the future of Russia's nuclear potential is becoming not so much theoretical as practical—particularly now that the lack of funds and the absence of constant and focused attention from top organs of power to the problems of the strategic nuclear forces could lead to their irreversible degradation. In tandem with this, the protracted uncertainty about ratification of the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) threatens to seriously delay the entire future disarmament process and introduces additional problems to the choice of the ideal solutions for modernizing the Russian Armed Forces' strategic nuclear component.

Statesmen who should already be taking responsible steps to choose long-term avenues for the organizational development of nuclear strategic forces are feeling an urgent need for a more accurate system of references in the emerging geopolitical situation, a need to understand what global military-political situation they will have to face in the future. And it is very important for them that some fragments of the picture of the future—despite the turbulent processes of change in the world order—are in a number of aspects acquiring new outlines.

A typical feature of the emergent era will be a change in the overall structure of influence in the world. Many specialists are noting that the bipolar structure with two opposed superpowers—the United States and the

USSR—is being replaced by a more traditional multipolar structure which, by reducing the opportunities for the superpowers to determine the course of world development, will enhance the role of other countries (such as the countries of Europe and the Pacific region), diversifying the arsenal of their ways and means of influencing world politics. According to a number of forecasts, the weakening of U.S. economic positions in favor of West Europe and Japan will make the United States' bonds of alliance with its partners in Europe and Asia more short-term and unstable, and international relations more complex, unstable, and less predictable as a result. Hence, the overall political situation in the world may be less predictable, hard to control even at regional, not to mention global, level, and likely to result in the emergence of acute crises and the appearance of additional spurs to confrontation. The distant rumbles of thunder can already be heard.

In the context of a multipolar world with criteria of influence and stability that are somewhat different and by no means always advantageous for Russia, when additional room is created for multilateral political maneuver, allies can very quickly become enemies, and the principle of "every man for himself" (remembering G. Washington's behest) prevails increasingly clearly in politics—under these circumstances it is hardly sensible to rush into all-out disarmament, giving up our national nuclear forces or even discussing handing them over to some kind of collective control. It would be an unforgivable mistake, giving in to complacent ideas about the end of the era of confrontation, to "tear the tails off" all Russia's strategic missiles, although this does not at all mean that we should not use the entire panoply of peaceful means of safeguarding Russia's national security or that we should end the disarmament negotiations.

The range of opinions on this issue, particularly now that politics has become part and parcel of our public awareness, is quite broad. Thus, there is a view (voiced in particular by ISKRAN [expansion unknown] staffers S.K. Oznobishchev and A.V. Surikov) that at a time of the transition to the building of strategic partnership relations between Russia and the United States, the use of the strategic stability criteria which were successfully used in the postwar decades is becoming senseless. Since this is the case, despite all the reservations befitting the current situation, nuclear weapons are allegedly becoming a kind of burden for Russia and should be gradually turned into the "last guarantee" of the security system "not only for Russia and the United States in isolation, but perhaps for a whole group of states united behind the principles of a collective security system within the UN framework."

Admittedly, it seems as though the United States is not yet ready to share with Russia its experience of these innovations, even though their general human and humanitarian thrust is evident. The nuclear powers' lack of enthusiasm on this subject is possibly explained by the fact that achieving an ideal combination of individual and collective means of defense is a complicated task

with no single solution. But that is a separate discussion. The actual agenda is different, and one specific problem is that Russia should maintain effective national strategic nuclear forces. At the same time, it somehow seems as though our enemy now is not any specific country or group of countries, but uncertainty (incidentally, the transition to planning for uncertainty has already been reflected in some official U.S. documents on military-strategic issues).

If we set out the development of military thinking in the nuclear planning sphere extremely simply and without any serious distortions, it can be said that the development of nuclear weapons arsenals has made certain changes to the targeted role of military strategy, which has become more broadly interpreted and is seen as a military-political strategy. In reality this has meant a change of emphasis in nuclear planning from the possibility of directly winning a nuclear war to the sphere of implementing political goals by means of the threat of war. The concept of political deterrence has supplemented the concept of nuclear deterrence—literally “containment by means of nuclear deterrence” [sderzhivaniye posredstvom yadernogo ustrasheniya]. It was based on the principle of the “balance of terror”—the certainty that each party to a potential nuclear conflict would inevitably suffer unacceptable damage in any nuclear war scenario. The logic of deterrence presupposed the permanent building up of the two superpowers’ nuclear potentials and an increase in the number of nuclear munitions and delivery systems to an irrational level (a kind of “foolish multitude”) that guaranteed the impossibility of one side winning in any meaningful way. Implementation of this concept turned into an outright arms race.

At the end of the sixties the stupidity of this approach to the organizational development of strategic nuclear forces was so obvious that the parties to the confrontation came to the conclusion that it was expedient to seek (very cautiously and gradually) new approaches to maintaining strategic stability and to implementing the concept of combining nuclear deterrence with arms control (so far only control).

If the strategic nuclear forces of the two states (or coalitions of states) are capable of inflicting unacceptable damage on each other in retaliation (retaliatory strikes and counterstrikes), then both sides restrain each other from aggression, military equilibrium exists between the states, and, consequently, military-strategic stability in their relations is maintained. Thus, deterrence is achieved by the possibility that strategic nuclear forces will deliver a retaliatory strike of such force in response to an enemy first strike that the idea of carrying out a first strike ceases to be attractive.

The method of maintaining strategic balance on the basis of the use of nuclear deterrence proved its effectiveness from many standpoints over the decades. But, like any “precision” instrument, it is very fragile and subject to many factors in real life. Thus, of itself the conclusion

that stability exists at any specific moment of time requires a very complex analysis of the military-political and military-technical reality, and consideration of a huge number of varied and, moreover, variable quantities in the most unexpected areas. We can also cite the sensitivity of this kind of stability to different symmetries and asymmetries in arms systems, and imbalances between rivals even within the framework of the “simple bipolar world.” Any changes in military potentials, on the one hand, promote the emergence of excessive suspicion in interstate relations, while, paradoxically, on the other hand objectively requiring the maintenance of a certain level of mutual confidence.

In this context many necessary but unilateral steps to sensibly improve national armed forces could upset the strategic equilibrium and should therefore be most carefully weighed up from the standpoint of whether or not they will be seen by the opposite side as an attempt to change the balance in its favor. Caution or active enmity can be caused by the improvement of the technical potential of conventional (nonnuclear) weapons, particularly in terms of warhead accuracy and yield, the development [sozdaniye] of any ABM systems with ambiguous roles, and so forth. The problem of somebody acquiring a decisive military advantage through a technological breakthrough also remains very topical. This likelihood does exist, which could tempt people to play their “untrumpable” card for the purposes of strong-arm blackmail.

That is why Russia and the United States, like other states, need to improve their strategic nuclear forces in areas that strengthen strategic equilibrium. And corresponding joint information about weapons systems in service should be envisaged.

In order to define the main avenues for the organizational development of national nuclear deterrence forces it is very useful to comprehensively analyze and take account of new concepts which have recently been actively developed and actually implemented by Western specialists in the sphere of strategic planning. These concepts are based on the initial premise that the most realistic threat to the security of the United States and its NATO allies now comes not from Russia and the other CIS countries but from “authoritarian” regimes (read “unfriendly,” as distinct, for instance, from “friendly dictators”), or regional interstate and interethnic conflicts using conventional weapons. It is within the framework of this doctrine that Western specialists have embarked on the elaboration of new approaches which will define the principles governing the use of nuclear arsenals for the next 10-20 years. In the United States in particular, in early 1993 L. Aspin, the then U.S. defense secretary, had already ordered an urgent review of the concept of the use of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Although officially the adoption of the new concept is planned only for this year, the main problems that have arisen in the course of its elaboration have been covered in sufficient detail. In particular, the U.S. strategists will not only have to revise the list of targets, but also review



once again whether the United States needs such a big nuclear potential, since maintaining it at its current level costs the United States \$10 billion a year at a time when the threat of an all-out nuclear war has significantly diminished. The military are also having to "rethink the methods for deterring new and old enemies."

It is worth noting that, in L. Aspin's opinion (and there is hardly any doubt about his competence on geostrategic matters), the main threat to U.S. security is now posed not by an increasingly predictable ("transparent") global strategic foe—as was the Soviet Union—but by a whole team of "political monsters" in the shape of "nuclear smugglers and double-dealing governments that reject international norms."

For all the lack of ambiguity in the interpretations of the role played by nuclear weapons in the present-day world, the renewed U.S. concept of "containment by means of nuclear deterrence" nonetheless remains the most important nuclear planning idea for the United States, and the novel aspect of the utilization of strategic nuclear forces will most probably lie in the search for "some kind of devilishly inventive new principles." Nothing is as yet known about these, incidentally—although L. Aspin admitted, discovering compelling reasons for it, that the approach of "monitoring the nuclear arsenal together with a threat of retribution" which had effectively influenced the Soviet Union, "may not frighten the new owners of nuclear weapons at all." In this event it cannot be ruled out, at least theoretically, that there will be an expanded range of missions for strategic nuclear weapons to carry out—from peaceful containment through deterrence on the basis of the inflicting of unacceptable damage, to the limited combat use of nuclear weapons alongside conventional (nonnuclear) systems. The main aim of the limited combat use of nuclear weapons would be to prevent a military conflict from developing into all-out hostilities—that is, in an unfavorable direction for the state under attack—and to defuse the conflict. We cannot rule out new and original ways of parrying the threat from "nuclear smugglers and double-dealing governments." For instance, the potential threat of nuclear terrorism could be eliminated by implementing the idea of global information transparency in the nuclear sphere, whereby secret activity in manufacturing and moving not only nuclear devices, but in accumulating a "critical mass" of fissile materials would become impossible. Governments that prove intractable in this area could be (as has already happened) removed from the political scene for the required period of time by establishing control over the ruling elites in these countries or with the help (and there are plenty of examples of this too) of limited military and other sanctions—which would easily be feasible within the framework of a policy of regionalism or simply under UN mandate. But the latter measures might not always be successful—therefore the reality of using strong-arm methods, regrettable though it may be, should be retained.

We should be more interested in the question of whether Russia is ready to propose its own vision of the use of strategic nuclear forces. The undoubtedly honest position of the new Russian military doctrine—now being extensively commented upon—on the possible use of a nuclear first strike can be seen mainly as a reaction to traditional strategic challenges and as being largely brought about by the country's situation and, accordingly, by the state of its Armed Forces. To all appearances, even the modernization of Russia's strategic nuclear forces, which is suggested under the framework of the treaties on offensive arms reduction, does not make it possible to do anything but implement deterrence within the framework also of the "traditional" military-strategic situation with the criterion of inflicting unacceptable damage on any aggressor in retaliatory action.

When talking of the category of "unacceptable damage," we should take account of present-day views of this problem. We realize now that this category has, as it were, two dimensions, and can be framed within two systems of coordinates. It is usual to consider (and, incidentally, this understanding emerged relatively recently), that the criterion of unacceptable damage exists simultaneously as a certain quantitative level of losses and as a kind of psychological barrier.

The question of the norm of unacceptable damage is incredibly complex. Military specialists honestly admit the failure of the numerous attempts to define a more or less objective level for it. Staffs in both Russia and the United States are now using in their practical activity the mathematical value of a set amount of damage (required for deterrence) which nonetheless plays an important role in assessing the strategic balance when defining the limits of restrictions in the course of drawing up disarmament treaties and, most important of all, serves as a kind of guideline in shaping major state programs for the quantitative and qualitative development of strategic offensive arms.

We should not downplay the positive significance that the idea of a quantitative assessment of the force required to inflict "unacceptable damage" on an enemy has possessed for the development of the strategic situation, looked at retrospectively. It was this idea that made it possible to conclude more or less objectively that there was nuclear parity between the USSR and the United States—which made it possible for one of the parties to dump its psychological baggage and provided an incentive for a disarmament process based on mutual recognition of the impossibility of either side's winning any substantial advantage in the context of balanced cuts in strategic offensive arms. At the same time, let us emphasize yet again that the criterion of "unacceptable damage" was to all intents and purposes never used as the basis for the adoption of the "final" decision to launch a nuclear strike within the context of the nuclear deterrence doctrine. Its mechanistic meaning (incidentally, if it could have been used as a guideline, then the choice of the time to launch a first strike could easily



have been delegated to computers) cannot be related to the huge moral responsibility which a political leader would have to assume when deciding to start a nuclear war. We need only recall the Caribbean crisis, when the correlation of nuclear munitions was 17-1 in favor of the United States. (The Soviet Union had around 290 nuclear munitions, while the Americans had something in the order of 5,000). You can also imagine under what scenario the war in the Persian Gulf would have been played out if Iraq had had a few primitive nuclear munitions at the time. Most probably there would have been no war, and the task of liberating Kuwait would have been resolved by different means.

Few people give much thought to the fact that the category of terror and the category of "unacceptable damage" in its psychological dimension are historical categories—times change, old moral principles and stereotypes are being tightened up and new ones are taking shape; attitudes toward the permissibility and probability of nuclear war are also being reconsidered by the political leaders of the major nuclear powers. Throughout postwar history common sense has never yet deserted them, which has made it possible at least to avert several global nuclear conflicts. There are no grounds for supposing that the current U.S. leaders have "frozen" their idea of what constitutes acceptable damage for their country as a result of an exchange of nuclear strikes with Russia at the level imagined by President Eisenhower. When in 1989 the U.S. plan for a nuclear attack on the USSR, drawn up in 1957, was declassified, environmental specialists were quick to produce a model of the consequences for the United States of launching such a nuclear strike against the USSR. It turned out that if all the planned 180 high-yield atomic and hydrogen bombs were exploded on Soviet territory, the USSR would be guaranteed to cease to exist as a state, but in two or three weeks the level of radioactive fallout on U.S. territory as a result of the natural spread of radioactive dust through atmospheric air currents would be comparable to 60 Chernobyls. Of course, the accuracy of these assessments (from the "greenhouse effect" to "nuclear winter") can be disputed, but one would like to hope that nobody would try to do a real experiment to check them out.

More and more experts today are inclined to think that nuclear weapons cannot be used in principle.

It is, nevertheless, not possible to wholly agree with this, since the unambiguous exclusion of the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons removes their deterrent effect. You could even use sophistry to prove the opposite. But in practice the basis of deterrence is the probability of the use of nuclear weapons. References to the irrationality of their use and their terrible consequences, which make it impossible to achieve the political aims of a war, are convincing but leave room for doubt. For instance, in August 1914, when World War I was already building up a head of steam in Europe, certain U.S. newspapers thought it appropriate to state something to the effect that the systems (primarily artillery systems) in the sides'

arsenals were so destructive that it was difficult even to imagine the consequences of a war—and therefore there could simply not be a war. Another example is that Indian tradition has it that the events described in the heroic epic "The Mahabharata" (compiled in its present form around the middle of the first millennium) relate to some wars and great social upheavals of the fourth millennium BC. The epic describes various types of what we would now call mass destruction weapons, whose use required a difficult psychological barrier to be overcome. R. Oppenheimer, one of the developers of the atomic bomb, directly associated the Mahabharata's "light brighter than a thousand suns" with a nuclear explosion. For us it is not so important which modern arms systems might correlate to the types of weapons described there. What is important was something else—there was an entire science behind their use (star-gazing and their own system of combat using "divine weapons"). "No man should ever think of warring with them. Should they fall into the hands of the weak, they could consume this entire transient world. They should always be used as a defense against other weapons. They are wonderful, they cannot be parried, but they can repulse an attack in which any other weapon is used [divnoye, ono neotvratimo, no udar vsyakim drugim oruzhiyem ono otbivayet]." The psychological barrier was nonetheless overcome, and the weapons were used, despite the warning that some types of them would lead to an effect, seen in a modern reading, on the human genetic code. We can only hope that the current system of deterrence will prove more effective.

It should not, however, be thought that the existence of nuclear forces under present-day conditions is able to prevent the unleashing of any conventional wars and armed conflicts—particularly on the periphery of the superpowers' spheres of influence. Since there are now a multitude of precisely such conflicts, nuclear weapons are not omnipotent. Hence the need to develop conventional systems—precision weapons. The development of precision weapons is also expedient for another reason—states (albeit in the very distant future, or at least not in the foreseeable future) may give up nuclear weapons, and the full burden of the task of ensuring deterrence will be borne by conventional weapons systems. This will not happen in one sudden surge, there should be a long period when the task of deterrence is resolved through the combined use of nuclear and conventional systems. But the task of developing precision weapons is very complex, requires the diversion of considerable material and financial expenditure, and will last just as long—since it depends on the development (razrabotka) not just of precision systems but on computerized reconnaissance, targeting, and guidance networks. Consequently, the basis for its elaboration should be developed right now. But, at the same time, it is necessary to recall that if a state does not have the requisite conventional weapons for deterrence, then it should not destroy its nuclear weapons even if all other states scrapped their nuclear weapons. Otherwise this would lead to a destabilization of the situation and to the possible unleashing of a war or military conflict.

Thus, we can conclude that the main role of the Russian strategic nuclear forces should be to continue to safeguard Russia's national security. And the makeup of these forces, the technical features of their systems, the organization of their combat and auxiliary subunits, and so forth should meet two criteria—first, the ability to effectively deter any aggressor against launching a war; and, second, the ability to put a stop to aggression by ruling out the possibility of a military conflict escalating into large-scale hostilities, to suppress military conflict, and to ensure a quest for compromise in the course of peace talks.

From the preceding reflections it becomes clear that we currently have a fundamental opportunity for a fairly broad choice of ways to develop the Russian strategic nuclear forces. It is even permissible to speak of their possible radical restructuring with the complete renouncement of the use of old stereotypes and strategic concepts, as if going back to the very beginning, and, incidentally, the situation regarding the reappraisal of values in the country as a whole accords with this. However, in the face of the systemic crisis which Russia and other CIS states have found themselves in, tough restrictions, mainly financial ones, have been imposed on the choice of real ways of developing strategic offensive arms. The majority of Russian military specialists agree that only two of them are realistically practicable: Either to "go it alone" and take unilateral steps to reduce the numerical strength of the strategic nuclear forces and change their structure, or else to conduct the modernization of the strategic nuclear forces within the framework of the process of the mutual reduction of strategic nuclear arms with our former main opponent, and then in coordination with other member states of the nuclear club. Circumstances have taken shape in such a way that Russia has taken the second path, which is justified in the present conditions. Although well-founded misgivings exist concerning the possibility of the American side, even within the framework of the restrictions of the START I and START II Treaties, to quickly increase its nuclear potential if the United States were to withdraw from these treaties, the rules of the game which have been adopted are nevertheless better than a situation whereby the Americans could do this without any of the current restrictions.

START II, as an important international document, has been the subject of a most careful study by a wide circle of Russian experts. A multitude of articles exists on practically every aspect of the problems of strategic stability, which this treaty raises and broaches. The fact that good work has been done on this question from the viewpoint of information and analysis obviates the need for us to further examine the quantitative and qualitative restrictions which the treaty places on the strategic nuclear potentials of Russia and the United States. It is appropriate to ask oneself just the main question here: Will the treaty preserve strategic stability and will the new level of the nuclear potential established for Russia be sufficient as a deterrent? When analyzing these problems, two focal points in the discussions of various

aspects of this treaty must be singled out. This concerns first of all a triadic (Strategic Missile Forces plus Navy and Air Force strategic nuclear forces) or a dyadic (Strategic Missile Forces plus either Navy or Air Force strategic nuclear forces, and so on) structure of the strategic nuclear forces, and the number of nuclear munitions which Russia is authorized to have. Second, the quantitative distribution of the number of munitions among the various components (naval, air, and land-based) of strategic offensive arms. The expediency of a triadic or dyadic structure of strategic nuclear forces for a particular state is determined by its geostrategic position, the capacity of its technical personnel and resources for servicing strategic nuclear weapons, the tactical-technical characteristics of the strategic nuclear forces it has, and the parameters of its means of active counteraction against a potential adversary. Thus, by assessing the aforesaid parameters of the United States' systems, we will obtain practically equal combat capabilities for the land-based and naval components of the U.S. strategic nuclear forces in terms of hitting targets. This testifies to the possibility of the United States transferring to a dyadic (naval and air components) structure of strategic nuclear forces and the elimination of land-based ICBM's.

Unlike the United States, an effective strategic nuclear forces structure for Russia which would guarantee the nuclear deterrence of any aggressor in any strategic situations, is a triad: Strategic Missile Forces plus Naval strategic nuclear forces plus Air Force strategic nuclear forces. Excluding the Strategic Missile Forces, the Naval strategic nuclear forces or the Air Force strategic nuclear forces from the triadic structure of Russia's strategic nuclear forces would lead, according to certain calculations, to an increase in the number of nuclear munitions required for deterrence within the strategic nuclear forces by a factor of 1.2-1.6, and in individual strategic situations, to the nonfulfill of the combat mission. This discrepancy in the rational structures whereby the Russian and the U.S. strategic nuclear forces are composed is attributable to the inferior survivability of the naval component of Russia's strategic nuclear forces (see V. Belousov's article) as compared with the analogous parameters of the U.S. strategic nuclear forces. This deficiency in the Russian naval strategic nuclear forces may be compensated for and is compensated for by a Strategic Missile Forces land-based stationary and also road-mobile force. The triadic structure of the Russian strategic nuclear forces provides a guaranteed counter to technological breakthroughs in the military sphere, for example in air defense, ABM defense, or antisubmarine defense. Such a strategic nuclear force structure creates a great deal of uncertainty for a possible aggressor as to the effectiveness of his preemptive strike, and is a factor which stabilizes the strategic equilibrium. Therefore it is impermissible to remove one of the components from the Russian strategic nuclear forces.

## NAVAL FORCES

### Memorandum Highlights Northern Fleet's Money Problems

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in Russian 4 Apr 94 pp 1, 2

[Reprint of extracts from "Information Memorandum 'On State of Affairs in the Northern Fleet,'" followed by commentary by Colonel Robert Bykov, carried under general heading "Russian Northern Fleet Is Being Killed Slowly and Tastefully. Sensational Document Falls Into KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's Hands"]

[Text]

#### Information Memorandum "On State of Affairs in the Northern Fleet"

1. General Evaluation of the State of the Northern Fleet and of the Problem of Ensuring the Combat Activity of the Fleet's Forces and the Social Protection of Servicemen and Their Families and Civilian Personnel

The Northern Fleet is one of the most powerful and modern of the Russian Federation Armed Forces' operational-strategic formations.... At the present time the Northern Fleet is the only force capable of opposing the NATO countries' naval groupings in the North Atlantic region.

The fleet's role in, and responsibility for, the defense of the Russian Federation's economic interests in the transpolar region is increasing because of the exploitation of oil and gas reserves on the continental shelf, the protection of fishing, the escort of transarctic crossings and ships traveling from Europe to the Far East and Southeast Asia, and also the provision of reliable cover for access to the world's oceans.

The viability and combat effectiveness of the fleet depend on full and timely financing. However, in recent times the Russian Federation Ministries of Finance and Defense have been implementing only partial financing of the Northern Fleet. The shortage of money has led to a 45 percent reduction in the Northern Fleet's ships and vessels since 1988. Industry delivers only two combatant ships every year. At the same time more than 50 ships were decommissioned in 1991-1993. Special alarm is caused by the state of the recycling of nuclear submarines, the storage and reprocessing of radioactive waste, and by questions of radiation and ecological safety. The irregularity of finance and the inability to pay suppliers is causing serious breakdowns in the provision of fuels and lubricants to the fleet. The absence of a mechanism for the practical implementation of individual articles of the Russian Federation Law "On the Status of Servicemen" for the provision of social and legal guarantees and privileges to servicemen and their families, and also

delays in payment and indexation of wages and allowances, are having a detrimental effect on the vital activity and morale of the fleet's naval and civilian personnel....

The cadre problem has become acute—as a result of the exodus of the population from the Kola Peninsula to the countries of the CIS and the Russian Federation's central oblasts a great shortage of skilled specialists has arisen in the maintenance services and subdepartments which ensure the vital activity of Northern Fleet garrisons. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that the most qualified specialists are moving into local administration structures because of the low level of pay in comparison with similar services in the Russian Federation's housing and utilities sector.

The difficulties of maintaining the fleet's personnel levels at full strength are growing. Analysis of the young replacement recruits arriving on the ships showed a sharp reduction in the qualities exhibited by draftees. The number of servicemen with health defects and inadequate physical development has grown significantly (from 1.2 percent to 6.7 percent), and the number of new-arrivals with disproportionate heights and weights has increased. One in five young seamen are guilty of deviant behavior; one in six were brought up in single-parent families, mainly by the mother....

#### On Ship Repairs and the Recycling of Ships and Radioactive Waste

In 1993 the Northern Fleet had 332 ships in need of repair. These included 35 nuclear submarines, seven diesel submarines, 39 surface ships, and 251 service craft. On the basis of the quantity of money allocated only 21 combatant ships were sent for repairs. Thus the fleet's total repair requirements were met by 27 percent. The repair of auxiliary fleet ships is a cause for special alarm. With a total requirement of 5.0 billion rubles [R] and \$40 million for these purposes only R283 million were allocated in 1993, which constitutes 3.8 percent. This state of affairs could lead to failures in ensuring the fleet's combat effectiveness by as early as 1995. At the same time it is essential to bear in mind that as of today 42 percent of ships have completed their regulation service lives and are liable to be withdrawn from the fleet, while the period between repairs has been allowed to overrun for 53 percent of ships.

There are 112 foreign-built ships in the fleet. The routine repairs of more than 70 of these are overdue. Since 1993 these ships have ceased to be sent abroad for repairs because of the lack of hard currency appropriations....

In order to fulfill the recycling program and the START treaties, appropriations at the level of R899.0 million (in current prices) are needed. In 1993 the fleet received R1,566,700,000 (17.4 percent of the sum requested).

A critical situation has arisen in the fleet over the removal of spent nuclear fuel. In 1992 the fleet ended the practice of dumping liquid and solid radioactive waste in



the sea. The temporary storage areas for solid radioactive waste are completely full....

Because of the absence of finance for the capital construction of storage facilities for spent nuclear fuels and a permanent special-purpose wharf [statsionarnyy tekhnologicheskii prichal] in the Andreyev and Nerpichye inlets and for the repair and modernization of the railroad from Kola Station to Nerpichye Station, the fleet cannot begin the removal of spent nuclear fuel in the new ecologically safe TK-18 containers....

#### **On Missile and Artillery Weapons**

Efficiency in the solution of questions regarding the repair of missile and artillery weapon components and the replenishment of spare parts, tools, and accessories kits has sharply deteriorated. Since January 1991 the Navy Armored Tank Supply Service has failed to achieve the task of supplying the Northern fleet with new MAZ-537 tow trucks to replace those whose engine life has expired.... The fleet has four floating cranes left which are permitted to be used on operations involving special-category freights; new ones are not being delivered.... The cranes are being stretched to the maximum. Their failure would entail the end of work with special-category freights.... The problem of recycling arms and munitions currently in operation at Northern Fleet bases and storehouses is acute. A large number of missiles for which there are no carriers has accumulated....

#### **On Mines and Torpedos**

It is essential to accelerate the production of mines and antimine weapons at the Russian Federation's defense industry plants in the cities of St. Petersburg, Perm, Votkinsk, and Yekaterinburg, where the necessary production facilities exist. This is connected with the fact that the chief plants for the production of these weapons are in Kazakhstan, and arms production at them has already ceased. There is no possibility of replenishing arms reserves in the fleet....

#### **On Supplying Fuels and Lubricants**

In connection with the fleet's monetary debts to industrial enterprises, supplies of petroleum products and solid fuel to the fleet have virtually ceased. The fleet received 68 percent of its diesel fuel requirement in 1993. There are not sufficient tanks to store fuel....

#### **On the Maritime Engineering Service**

At the present time worker and employee manning levels in the Northern Fleet's communal services stand on average at 20-30 percent. In order to maintain the stock of housing and barracks and communal facilities in proper running order the command authorities have been forced to divert personnel to the aforementioned work. This is seriously detrimental to the combat training and combat readiness of the fleet's units. Given the existing personnel shortage (around 40 percent), people are being seriously physically overstretched....

In view of the manning levels and the technical condition of the ships, the fleet is delivering only 36 percent of the planned level of stocks, including 50 percent (52,000 tonnes) of liquid fuel requirements and 17 percent (15,000) of dry freight requirements by means of its own resources; hence the fleet is forced every year to hire ships from civilian ship owners, which requires additional monetary expenditure, including of hard currency. The fleet does not have ships of its own capable of transporting the necessary amount of freight. Of the 50 transport ships the fleet needs, it actually has just 35 (70 percent), among which 19 (54 percent) have completed their regulation service lives and are due to be written off.

#### **On Clothing Supplies**

At the present time, because of shortfalls in supplies from industry of a large number of items of military dress, the situation as regards the provision of clothing to the fleet's forces remains tense. Thus, for example, supplies of fur jackets for submariners meet 1 percent of requirements, supplies of footwear, 76 percent of requirements.

#### **On Food Supplies**

The nonfulfillment of the Russian Federation President's directive "On the Abolition of Advance Payment for Products (Commodities) Delivered to Regions of the Far North and Equivalent Localities" is leading to increasing difficulties in providing food for personnel.

The safekeeping of food is a pressing problem, owing to the shortage of storage capacities. In individual garrisons there are shortages of up to 30 percent of the storehouses, depots, and refrigerators that are required. The material-technical base of military trade remains a tricky problem. In garrisons in Pechenga, Vysokiy, Kilp-Yavr, Afrikanda, Korzunovo, and Kildin Island, and others, 70 percent of enterprises are housed in dilapidated, unadapted premises built before the war.

#### **On the Provision of Housing**

The Northern Fleet has a sufficient material and technical base and sufficient personnel to construct and commission the necessary facilities.... However, questions of funding housing construction today encroach extremely painfully on the interests not only of people, but also of production units. Social tension is growing in the labor collectives of "Sevvoymorstroy"....

#### **On Ensuring the Social Protection of Servicemen and Their Families**

The adoption of a package of laws on the social protection of servicemen and their families has been positively received in the Northern Fleet. However, the adopted laws of the "military" package are not yet operating fully....

#### **On Closed Administrative-Territorial Entities**

The majority of the Northern Fleet's remote garrisons have the status of closed administrative-territorial entities. The peculiarities of life in these entities require an increased level of budget finance and additional social protection measures, privileges, and guarantees provided at state level. Analysis shows that the Russian Federation Law "On the Closed Administrative-Territorial Entity" is not being fully implemented.

Appeals received from inhabitants of the cities of Murmansk-140, Murmansk-150, and the settlement of Vidyayevo reflect the most typical socioeconomic problems of the Northern Fleet's remote garrisons. These appeals (they are forwarded to the apparatus of the Russian Federation Council of Ministers-Government) demand the adoption of additional measures to ensure the implementation of the law.

#### **Our Commentary**

The Northern Fleet was in 1993 recognized as the best fleet of the Russian Federation. The authors of the memorandum—high-ranking Russian military men—try in the language of facts and figures to explain to the State Duma and the minister of defense that the country could soon be deprived of its most combat-effective fleet, and thus by the end of the century be without a proper maritime strategic defense system. Unfortunately, this is happening at a time when, in accordance with the START-II treaty, the proportion of the sea-launched grouping of ICBM's in Russia is doubling. Perhaps the situation in the world has thawed to such a degree that other countries have kissed their navies

goodbye? It would appear not: In the United States, for example, more than 100 ships are being commissioned in 1993-1995, including three aircraft carriers, seven missile-carrying submarines, 18 nuclear multi-purpose submarines, eight cruisers, 16 destroyers, three amphibious warships, three acoustic research ships, and seven tankers. This is no accident: Any state that pretends to the role of a great power must ensure its naval power.

So, is it possible to resolve the Northern Fleet's problems under real economic conditions? One method was proposed at a session of the Interdepartmental Commission for Defense Security held 28 April under the chairmanship of A. Kokoshin. The proposal was to derive funds to set up a new infrastructure for the Northern Fleet on the basis of "centers of growth" of industrial production and the diversification of military-industrial complex enterprises and through the subsequent increase of the tax base and the influx of private money. The minimum number of ultramodern combatant ships in the fleet will be determined on the basis of national security interests, and the full support of these ships with auxiliary vessels and shore services should eliminate the disproportion between the combatant ships' requirements and the possibilities of servicing them. All the same the impression arises that moods leading, to put it mildly, to the underestimation of the role of a strong Navy—which is designed to support Russia's strategic interests—have gained the upper hand in the country's military-political leadership. All the attention of several Ministry of Defense leaders is today focused on mobile forces, and the backbone of these forces—Airborne Troops, which are intended to be the basis of Russia's military might. However, it is no secret that mobile forces are designed primarily for fighting an internal enemy. Does this mean that danger to Russia from without no longer exists?

## INTERREGIONAL MILITARY ISSUES

### Lt-Gen Dyukov: Military Diplomacy in Caucasus

94UM0378A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
8 Apr 94 p 2

[Interview with Lt-Gen B. Dyukov, first deputy commander, Group of Russian Troops in Transcaucasus, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Vitaliy Denisov: "A Practical Military Diplomacy in Transcaucasus"; date and place not given; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The Group of Russian Troops in the Transcaucasus has been created relatively recently. What tasks does it face? What is the reason for a Russian troop presence abroad? These were the first questions put by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's correspondent to Lieutenant-General B. Dyukov, first deputy commander, Group of Russian Troops in the Transcaucasus.

[Dyukov] The GRVZ [Group of Russian Troops in Transcaucasus] is not simply a strategic grouping on the soil of friendly Georgia and Armenia. The local populace, and—let us admit it—many people in nearby countries look upon the Russian Armed Forces as offering the sole opportunity for normalizing the situation in this explosive area, with the only, and, possibly, the last, real chance for ending internecine and fratricidal warfare.

Another aspect is the moral, the humanitarian. I have in mind the fact that Russian military personnel on duty in Tbilisi, Batumi, Gyumri, and Akhalkalaki are fully-qualified representatives of the great Russia. In this connection, any move they make, their behavior is watched very closely and subjected to unforgiving analysis and evaluation by our true friends on the one hand, and by our enemies and opponents (of which there are many) on the other. For this reason, for military personnel, such concepts as professionalism, conscience, and soldier's honor hold special significance. A significance which the famous Russian military leader General Yermolov described as early as the 19th century as "practical military diplomacy" for the Russian Army in the Transcaucasus. This in spite of the fact that today's military service Russians are performing in the Transcaucasus has nothing in common with the missions and functions assigned to the Caucasian Army at the beginning of the last century.

[Denisov] One may say that the Transcaucasus area is the "hottest" of all places in the territory of the former USSR. Reports emanating from here are more often than not alarming. How does that affect the Group of Russian Troops?

[Dyukov] The peculiarities of the situation in the area naturally do exert an effect on service in the Transcaucasus. The instability of the situation accords priority status to guarding and defending sites, bases, and the territory on which military units are stationed. Pursuing this mission under conditions of an extreme personnel shortage is anything but simple. And it must be realized

that Russian military personnel must take on peace-keeping functions as well, such as in the fall of last year, when GRVZ men and officers assumed the burden of providing security for a segment of the railroad lying between Poti and Kutaisi.

In spite of the above, we cannot ignore combat readiness and military training of units and subunits. Combat training essentially boils down to commander training, but the arrival of contract servicemen affords us the opportunity of effecting a more effective, quality training process. There is much labor attached to this, it is true. For example, in the large unit stationed in Gyumri, the military authorities can organize weapons firing, driving exercises, special training, and even demonstration company tactical exercises including live firing. By agreement reached between the governments of Russia and Armenia and between the leadership of the ministries of defense of the two countries, it was at this time that permission was obtained to enlist republic citizens from among the Russian-speaking population, something which made it possible to effect a considerable improvement in filling the manpower needs of units and subunits. Commanders of other large units can only dream about that kind of scale of combat training.

I repeat: Interethnic conflicts in one way or another—some waxing, others waning—exert a direct influence on the life and activity of Russian troops in the area. Take Georgia as an example. The internal political situation in that Republic in 1992-1993 was anything but stable. The absence of a well-founded program of resolving the total socio-economic crisis, Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, state of war existing between the country's east and west—all of that contributed to an increase in extremism, to a defamatory and unacceptable observance of all laws. It is not surprising that Georgia turned into a chaotic mess. On top of that, a large part of the population took up looting.

But from whom to steal? The primary target of violence was the Russian military. And we were forced to protect ourselves, without expectation of help from the authorities, who incidentally until recently were not particularly of a loyal frame of mind with respect to us. Unfortunately, there were victims. In two years in the Transcaucasus, more than 50 enlisted men and officers lost their lives. Add to that the hundreds of pieces of motor vehicles and armored vehicles seized, incidents of forced eviction from apartments, constant threats hurled at servicemen's families, etc.

Yes, progress has been made in interrelationships with Georgia's leadership and the republic's minister of defense. The local populace's attitude toward the Russian military has shown some improvement. This definitely gives rise to hope: The realization has fully arrived whereby seizing our vehicles and plundering Russian troop facilities can cause only harm, not good, primarily to Georgia.



[Denisov] The situation is apparently somewhat more favorable in this respect in the large unit stationed in the city of Gyumri.

[Dyukov] There was a time when Russian troops in Armenia suffered difficulties. Desperate persons of the opposition would shout about the need for immediate withdrawal of the 7th Guards Army from Republic soil. The army departed. But now, some time later, many representatives of the power structures and even yesterday's "irreconcilables" openly admit their hastiness and generally the wrongfulness of their past statements and actions. The people simply realized that Russians are not enemies, that we—both Armenians and Russians—who have lived together for centuries, cannot exist separately.

Also of no small importance is something else. Even during the years when the situation attending our units stationed in Armenia caused unrest and apprehension, when some "gentlemen of opportunity" took it upon themselves to test the vigilance of Russian military personnel, we were always extended understanding on the part of the state's leadership and the power ministries. Criminals were delivered due punishment, while that which was seized or stolen was in most cases returned to the rightful owners. That firmness apparently also played a role in ending the lawlessness with respect to the Russian military.

[Denisov] In our conversation, we have not brought up the subject of another Transcaucasus republic: Azerbaijan.

[Dyukov] The fact of the matter is that there are no GRVZ units or large units stationed on the soil of the Azerbaijani Republic. Nonetheless, we are maintaining the necessary working contacts with this country's leadership and with representatives of the Ministry of Defense. The reason for this is that passing through Azerbaijan are military trains carrying freight shipped in support of the Group of Troops. These trains do at times raise passions. At times there are complaints of documents incorrectly filled out, while at other times allegations are made accusing the armed guards riding the trains of engaging in espionage. It is true that a complaint we lodged directly with the Azerbaijani minister of defense resulted in speeding up the trains.

[Denisov] During the recent visit to Georgia made by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev, a statement was issued relative to a long-term presence of Russian troops in the area and the creation of several military bases on Transcaucasus territory. In your opinion, how will this be made a reality, and how will this affect the lives and service of our military personnel?

[Dyukov] Yes, Russia did make a statement dealing with the existence of strategic interests beyond the mountains of the Transcaucasus. However, in this regard, this is a long-term program not of a military presence, but of political, economic, and military cooperation which is directly dependant upon the internal political situation, say in this same Georgia. A particular leader may support

the idea of a union with Russia, while his replacement may oppose it. Today's parliament may be in favor of ratifying treaties and agreements, while tomorrow's may reject them. Thus, the expression "long-term" as it applies to the Transcaucasus is highly relative. And discussion along this line unfortunately does not include a strategic perspective, only a specific time—the end of 1995. Concerning military bases, in light of the agreement arrived at between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Georgia on Friendship, Neighborliness, and Cooperation, our Group is facing a change in the near future to a new, so-called "base-line" troop organization and equipment structure. This will require adopting a highly serious approach and exertion of greater efforts to acquire new skills, knowledge, and the necessary experience.

[Denisov] Many young men about to be inducted into the Army are apprehensive about leaving for service in the Transcaucasus. Officers are also less than enthusiastic to come here. However, service under these conditions, often extreme, is undoubtedly an excellent school for acquiring professional and life skills.

[Dyukov] All I can say is that service in the Transcaucasus very quickly brings out what a person is like. There is no room for weaklings and whiners here. Cowardice and faintheartedness are evaluated here not in terms of moral categories, but rather in lives. Service in the GRVZ is for those who understand that the purpose of the military person is either to protect and guard or to take up the offensive and liberate. It is for those who are willing to sacrifice warmth and comfort for something greater. But then, this is a matter of each person's conscience.

Does the service really promote professionalism? Most likely, if we think of this as doing one's duty, as irreplaceable accomplishment of assigned responsibilities, personal discipline, and strength of the spirit. All these qualities are manifested more clearly and remarkably under the conditions of the Transcaucasus. And here it is not so important whether you have graduated from a military VUZ or have just been inducted into the ranks of the Armed Forces. That is why we have included among those awarded combat decorations and medals not only officers and warrant officers, but quite often enlisted men and non-commissioned officers.

[Denisov] Transcaucasus service personnel are granted certain privileges, knowledge of which is not widespread. In this connection, this could serve as an incentive for those who are wondering whether to enlist or not.

[Dyukov] There are many privileges. This includes 18 months' credit for 12 months of service, base pay plus half, and an additional two weeks of leave. I probably could not list all of them. Speaking of the material aspect, an enlisted man joining us on a draft basis, is paid, on the average, 80,000 to 100,000 rubles. Contract service pays up to 200,000 rubles. However, I repeat that this is not the main thing.



Only by serving with us can a youth come to a rapid realization of his worth as a man and a person and appreciate the value of real service and Army brotherhood.

#### **Moldova Calls for Withdrawal of 14th Army by Mid-1994**

94UM0374B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
3 Apr 94 p 3

[Article by KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Sergey Knyazkov under the "Events and Comments" rubric: "Bugle to Sound March Order?: Talks Determining Future of 14th Army"]

[Text] As previously reported in KRSNAYA ZVEZDA, the eighth round of Russian-Moldovan talks is opening in Kishinev. Listed on the agenda are a draft of the Agreement on the Status, Conditions, and Procedure for the Withdrawal of the 14th Army, a number of other important issues governing the activity of troops, and social and pension coverage for military personnel.

The interests of Moldova, the Dniester area, and Russia are focused on the 14th Army. Moldova, acting with the republic's integrity in mind, is calling for the withdrawal of the 14th Army by the middle of this year. The reasoning here, according to Moldovan Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Ion Butnaru, is that the army's withdrawal may "accelerate the resolution of the conflict between Moldova and the Dniester area."

Completely different is the view held by the leadership of the unrecognized Pridniestr Moldovan Republic, in that it expects the new leadership of the Moldovan parliament to provide not statements promising a resolution to the Dniester area conflict (something which have been given in abundance), but rather solid, document-based guarantees for reliable protection of interests of the PMR [Pridniestr Moldovan Republic]. However, there are as yet no guarantees; the sole guarantee of peace and security on the left bank of the Dniester, in the opinion of the Dniester area residents, continues to be the 14th Army. And this in spite of the fact that relations between the PMR's leadership and the military authorities of the Russian Army have, for a number of reasons, suffered a noticeable decline. In all likelihood, the PMR's recent decision to appropriate and render as republic property all the weapons and property of the 14th Army is a reflection of this situation and an attempt to force Russia to play a more active role in resolving the conflict between Kishinev and Tiraspol.

In response, the 14th Army's military council demanded that the "provocative" decision be rescinded, and Commander Lieutenant-General Aleksandr Lebed issued the order "to employ weapons, firing for effect" to repel any attacks on Russian service personnel and military installations. The RF [Russian Federation] Minister of Foreign Affairs also made a strong statement on this subject. Nonetheless, Russia still faces holding difficult talks with Kishinev, even after condemning the acts perpetrated by the Tiraspol authorities, since we are interested in

extending the mandate of the 14th Army's presence on Moldovan soil, possibly as a basis of the Russian Army.

This is where Kishinev must be realistic. Withdrawing the Army by the end of August and beginning of September 1994 is absolutely impossible. In addition, redeploying weapons and equipment, which are manned by local draftees and contract servicemen in the amount of 85 percent, is something which even the people of the PMR will not permit. And these realities must be dealt with whether one wishes or not.

#### **Talks On 14th Army Continue**

94UM0377A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
8 Apr 94 p 3

[Article by Captain Valeriy Russu: "Talks on Withdrawal of 14th Army Continue"]

[Text] The eighth round of Russian-Moldavian [Moldovan] talks on reconciling the text of an agreement on the legal status, procedure, and time-table for the withdrawal of units of the 14th Army, stationed in the Dniestr region, has ended in Kishinev. Despite some progress, the talks were difficult. The stumbling block is the agreement's second article, which deals with the time-table for withdrawing the 14th Army from Moldavia [Moldova]. Differences over it have yet to be overcome.

As is known, the Moldavian [Moldovan] side is insisting that the army be withdrawn by July 1 of this year, while Russia would prefer to resolve this issue only after the special status of the Dniestr region has been defined and social guarantees provided for former servicemen and members of their families. The delegations exchanged new texts of the article in Kishinev and decided to continue its discussion in the next round.

Anatol Tsaran, the Republic of Moldavia's [Moldova's] ambassador to the Russian Federation and the leader of the Moldavian delegation to the talks, said at a press conference that the Moldavian side had proposed a new time-table for withdrawing the units of the 14th Army over one year or a maximum of two years. The Russian side disagrees with this and is proposing a longer period of time on account of the social and housing problems involved in withdrawing the troops and, to a certain extent, the unresolved Dniestr region issue. So far, the talks have for the most part succeeded in resolving only the issue of the troops' status.

During the just-ended round the delegation chiefs initialed a draft agreement between the two countries on issues of jurisdiction and mutual legal assistance with respect to matters relating to the temporary presence of Russian Army units on the territory of Moldavia, as well as an agreement between the Russian and Moldavian governments on social guarantees and pensions for former servicemen and members of their families.

As regards the 14th Army's property and weapons, the Chief of the Russian delegation at the talks, special ambassador Vladimir Kitayev, stressed all of it is owned by Russia. Representatives of the Dniestr region participated in the talks, as they had done in previous rounds. The next round is to be held in May in Moscow.

## UKRAINE

### Progress on Nuclear Disarmament Reported

#### Foreign Help for Sci-Tech Center

94UM0382A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
3 Nov 93 p 1

[Unattributed news item: "Center Founded"]

[Text] The governments of Canada, Sweden, Ukraine, and the United States signed an agreement to establish a scientific-technical center in Ukraine. The center's program will focus on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as the consideration, approval, and financing of projects that will employ scientists who previously worked in the armaments sector in peaceful, civilian scientific-technical fields.

The founding parties are planning to submit their proposals to the executive council in the very near future. All the countries that signed the agreement on founding this scientific-technical center have pledged substantial sums in U.S. dollars to help finance the center: the U.S.—10 million, Sweden—1.5 million, and Canada—2 million dollars. Ukraine has pledged to do everything necessary to prepare the center, allocate a building and equipment, and provide services.

#### Warhead Material for Reactor Fuel

94UM0382B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
16 Apr 94 p 1

[Unattributed news item: "Nuclear Warheads Are Returning to Ukraine as Fuel for Nuclear Electric Power Stations"]

[Text] The first batch of cassettes [kaset] has arrived from Russia at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Electric Power Station, Europe's largest AES, as payment for the dismantled nuclear warheads. This means that the practical implementation of the measures provided for in the trilateral declaration of the Presidents of Ukraine, Russia, and the United States on this issue has begun.

Experts estimate that the amount of fuel delivered to the Zaporizhzhya AES is sufficient to operate one of the five

reactors for a year. This will provide our country with 5.5-6 billion kilowatt-hours of cheap electric power.

#### Foreign Assistance in Weapons Liquidation

94UM0382C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
21 Apr 94 p 1

[UKRINFORM report: "They Are Prepared To Provide Ukraine with Assistance in Liquidating Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] Meeting with President Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine on 21 February, the ambassadors of the world's 14 leading countries (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Spain, Great Britain, and the United States) presented a declaration from the governments of their countries regarding their readiness to assist our country in the liquidation of the nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of Ukraine. As a follow-up to this initiative, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine invited the representatives of the above countries, along with representatives from Greece, the Republic of South Africa, South Korea, the United Nations, and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] to take part in the multilateral consultations, at which the scope and areas of assistance to Ukraine could be discussed.

These consultations began on 19 April at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine. Taking part in them are representatives from the ministries of defense; machine-building, conversion, and the military-industrial complex; foreign affairs; and education; and the State Committee on Nuclear and Radiation Safety. Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov delivered an opening statement.

It was stressed that a whole series of specific programs and projects in the areas that are of priority importance to Ukraine have been submitted for consideration by the Western countries and international organizations.

Responding to a request by journalists to comment on this important event, Valeriy Shmarov stated: It is very gratifying that many countries and influential international organizations have responded to our problems in the field of nuclear weapons liquidation. This is a show of great political support for us. As to actual economic assistance, each will help as best he can, as they say. The most tangible assistance at present has come from the United States. As we know, in accordance with the agreements that have been signed, the U.S. has allocated 350 million dollars of assistance to be used in carrying out the disarmament program. These funds have not yet been received, but matters are moving along. It should be said, in all fairness, that Ukraine is already engaged in nuclear disarmament. Thus, any assistance would be very timely.

**Conference Considers Partnership for Peace***94UM0382D Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
22 Apr 94 p 1*

[Article by Serhiy Zhurets, NARODNA ARMIYA commentator: "Partnership for Peace: A Step Forward or Marking Time?"]

[Text] An international conference on "Security in Europe: The Central European Component" has begun in Kiev. The conference is being sponsored by the Ukrainian Center for the Study of International Security Issues. The purpose of the conference is to assist the leaders of Central European states to work out possible options for creating a system of collective security in Europe.

This is the third conference of its kind in the last two years. As a result of the work done in the past, experts, scientists, and diplomats from Belarus, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Moldova, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine have concluded that there is a need to conduct international research on the problems of security in Europe and to engage specialists from the Central European countries, as well as Russia and NATO, in this endeavor.

Considering the high level of representation, one could conclude that the desired goal has been successfully reached. The military and civilian specialists who came to Kiev included not only representatives from countries in the immediate vicinity of Ukraine, but also from Great Britain, Germany, Spain, the United States, and Switzerland.

If we isolate the problems that pertain solely to Ukraine from among all the issues discussed during the first day of the conference, it becomes apparent that buttressing security by having Kiev join NATO's proposed "Partnership for Peace" is regarded as far from the best and only solution.

Professor Volodymyr Bruz, representing the Ukrainian Institute of International Relations, proposed another option. In his opinion, we need to strive for an alliance of East and West in a single structure. This will relieve tensions among the countries that have been left outside NATO and the CIS agreement on collective security. Moreover, this will immediately eliminate the problem of the entry of these countries into already existing military alliances. Security will be guaranteed because all European countries will become members of a single structure.

The Ukrainian specialist cited Russia's rather negative reaction to the joining of NATO's initiative by former Warsaw Pact members as confirmation of his thesis. The situation with respect to Ukraine will be much more difficult. "Russia will not allow Ukraine to join NATO until after Russia herself becomes a member of NATO, if she ever does so," believes the Ukrainian expert.

Ukraine's attempt to draw closer to NATO may aggravate Ukrainian-Russian relations.

However, Neville Hunter, the representative of NATO and a professor at NATO's military college, expressed the opinion that another structure should not be added to the already existing entities engaged in maintaining security. The North-Atlantic alliance is up to the job of resolving all problems.

The position of the Ukrainian defense department on this issue was expressed by Capt. 1st Rank Hryhoriy Perepelytsya, an officer of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. He noted: "NATO's 'Partnership for Peace' program will help us to normalize relations with Russia with the help of already existing international standards and executive structures, which will be put into effect by the program. It is therefore in our interest for Russia to join NATO's initiative as soon as possible."

Moreover, in the opinion of the Ukrainian officer, joining the "Partnership for Peace" does not mean the direct entry by the partnership members into the North-Atlantic alliance.

The conference is continuing. Its goal is to create an international group of experts and to agree on a plan of action to study the problems of European security.

**Sevastopol Naval Institute Emerges as Key Training Facility****Nuclear Department Reconfigured***94UM0367B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
10 Sep 93 p 1*

[Article by Lieutenant Andrey Lysenko: "A New Department Has Been Created"]

[Text] The reformation of the Sevastopol Naval Institute is continuing in accordance with the new curriculum.

Two departments that used to train specialists to service nuclear reactors on surface vessels and submarines have thus been combined and transformed into a department for nuclear power installations. The experienced instructors in it will train specialists for the nuclear electric power plants of Ukraine.

The refitting of the teaching laboratory, which has unique simulators of the control panels of operational shipboard nuclear power installations, will soon begin under the supervision of department chief Captain 1st Rank Nikolay Peregudov. Experienced specialists—representatives of the Ministry of Nuclear Power of Ukraine—will be assisting in this work.



**Kiev Naval Cadets Accepted at Sevastopol**

94UM0367E Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
30 Mar 94 p 1

[Unattributed news item: "The Kiev Cadets—Overboard?"]

[Text] Close to 70 cadets from the fourth-year class of the Kiev Higher Naval School [KVVMU] have arrived in Sevastopol to serve a tour of duty in the Ukrainian Navy and in the Black Sea Fleet. Thirty-eight of the cadets have already begun their tours in the initial positions of deputy commanders of ships 3rd rank with VSPR and officers in the battalions and companies of the Ministry of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, while their colleagues (more than 30 of them) who had concluded contracts with the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation have not gone to the Black Sea Fleet.

The Commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Eduard Baltin, rejected the cadets for tours of duty owing to the fact that the fleet has no money. This is even though advance agreement was reached between the command of the KVVMU and the command of the Black Sea Fleet on the tours for the cadets, which was confirmed by telegram of the Commander of the Russian Navy, Admiral Feliks Gromov. The next telegram from the same Gromov prohibited doing this. Why? This is not known.

The cadets from the KVVMU thus still do not have anything to do. While the commanding officer of their tours, Captain 2nd Rank Oleksandr Aksonov, tries to find a contact from the command of the Black Sea Fleet, the Chief of Staff of the Ukrainian Navy, Rear-Admiral Oleksiy Ryzhenko, has decided to accommodate the Kievans on the grounds of the Sevastopol Naval Institute.

**Rear Admiral Makarov Interviewed**

94UM0367A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
5 Apr 94 p 1

[Interview with Rear-Admiral Viktor Makarov by Captain-Lieutenant Albiy Shudrya: "The Institute is Being Reformed, Not Dissolved"]

[Text] Reports have appeared in the city newspaper *SLAVA SEVASTOPOLYA* and other Crimean publications on significant cutbacks in cadets at the Naval Institute. The authors of those features assert that the higher educational institution is in complete decline, and its graduates have no prospects with regard to the service. They ask whether it would not be better to train lieutenants for the fleets of Russia, and not only for the Ukrainian Navy. What is the sense of the cutbacks that are taking place? A discussion by the senior officer of the press center of the Ukrainian Navy, Captain-Lieutenant Albiy Shudrya, with SVMi [Sevastopol Naval Institute] Chief Rear-Admiral Viktor Makarov began with that question.

[Makarov] The Armed Forces of Ukraine are being cut back as a whole; their size has been defined by the

Supreme Soviet. The quantitative composition of the Navy is defined accordingly, and orders are placed from the state on that basis. We also train specialists for Derzhkomatom [State Committee for Nuclear Power] and Derzhkomkordon [State Border Commission]. As for the training of officers for the Russian Navy, Russia itself has refused this, taking out all cadets who did not take the Ukrainian oath. No one demanded any payment for the training of those cadets. We were prepared to complete their training without charge, in accordance with the Dahomys and Yalta agreements. Proceeding from some political views or ambitions, all of those people who did not want to study here were called back from Sevastopol in April of 1993.

We are prepared to work according to that plan, however. Belarus will possibly order some specialists—they do not have very many military schools—and Kazakhstan could also resolve the issue of training cadres here.

If such a proposal were to appear, we would of course study it...

The institute is not collapsing and is not being dissolved, but is rather being reformed. The group of those who want to study is being cut back, as is occurring at all of the higher educational institutions of Ukraine—both civilian and military. The state will be training as many specialists as it requires. The laboratory base, simulators, a number of departments and support personnel are all being preserved at the institute. Some naval services are being accommodated in the freed-up spaces, close to 50 percent of the premises today. As for the accommodation of subunits of the National Guard, that is disinformation.

[Shudrya] Why were more cadets than are needed accepted last year?

[Makarov] We were proceeding from the Yalta and Moscow agreements between Ukraine and Russia. The discussion concerns the division of the Black Sea Fleet [ChF] in a ratio of 50 percent to 50 percent. The order for the training of specialists was placed with a regard for that. We know today, however, that the resolution of the issue of the Black Sea Fleet at Massandra has been disrupted, and this group became unnecessary. The graduates of 1992-93 were thus greater than the requirements for officers. Some of the graduates, true, were sent to replenish the Ukrainian Navy. The ChF command, however, did not display any interest in assigning the young officers to vacant positions. Many of the graduates were discharged into the reserves.

[Shudrya] The cutbacks in cadets will lead to cutbacks in instructors. What will happen to the officers and scientific staff members?

[Makarov] We will not be dismissing the instructors, and do not intend to let anyone go. The naval scientific-research center is still far from fully staffed. There are many vacancies at command levels of the institute, and commanders of subunits, companies and departments are needed. There are also quite a few positions in the Ukrainian Navy that would suit our officers as well. I had a conversation with the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and I can report that such an opportunity will be granted in a case where there is a desire to continue service. There are also quite a few higher positions in the department of the Navy or at the newly created Armed Forces Institute of Ukraine.

[Shudrya] Newspaper features assert that the recruitment of cadets will now take place in Kiev. Has there really been such a decision?

[Makarov] There is such a version. People should come to the institute from other regions, not just from Sevastopol. Such an imbalance still exists. I feel that this is not entirely fair to the other inhabitants of Ukraine. The more so as many of the oblasts have assumed sponsorship of the Ukrainian Navy. Rivne Oblast, for example, is sponsoring the SVMi. The sponsors have assumed the obligation of sending their own representatives to take the examinations on a competitive basis.

[Shudrya] The institute has a good physical plant. Will it be preserved?

[Makarov] The physical plant that is needed by the Ukrainian Navy will be preserved, and no questions whatsoever can arise here. We do not intend to eliminate and dismantle it, but are rather proposing to use it, as before, for the training of cadets. As for a new physical plant, it still needs to be resolved where it will be.

[Shudrya] Tell me, if you would be so kind, will young men from Sevastopol be trained at the SVMi?

[Makarov] I have no doubt of it. The opportunities for access to the institute are the same for everyone. Knowledge, a desire to become a sailor, physical fitness and endurance, however, have to be mandatory. These criteria have always been taken into account. Today, in connection with the fact that the recruiting will be cut back, they move to the forefront. Our task is to select the best, wherever they may come from. Many unfortunately enter the institute only in order to study for a year or two in order to avoid the draft, and then leave. There are people from Sevastopol among those as well. I do not want us to err in selecting those for whom naval service is the path of the romantic.

#### **Faculty, Department Changes**

94UM0367C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
9 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank Oleksandr Shcherbakov under the rubric "Our Special Correspondents Report From Sevastopol": "In the Interests of the State and the Institute"]

[Text] The teachers and cadets of the power-engineering department of the Sevastopol Naval Institute imeni P.S. Nakhimov have launched another semester under new conditions. Qualitative changes in the training programs of the specialists for both the fleet and for the national economy have taken place under the supervision of department chief Captain 1st Rank V. Kiryachenko.

The Department of Electric-power Engineering (Chief, Captain 1st Rank S. Smyrnov), for example, has begun to train nuclear engineers for Derzhkomatom [State Committee for Nuclear Power].

The instructors of the Department for the Operation and Repair of Ships, under the supervision of Captain 1st Rank A. Lobanov, have developed a comprehensive program for shipbuilding and ship repairs for all of Ukraine, and have begun to train cadets in it.

A program under which the training of frogmen instructors for the military and civilian fleets is conducted has been introduced in the Department of Underwater Training and Shiplifting (chief, Captain 2nd Rank V. Holovin).

These facts testify to one thing—that the Sevastopol Naval Institute is being reformed in the interests of the state and the fleet, and also in the interests of the professors, instructors and cadets of the SVMi.

#### **Sevastopol Institute to Become Naval Academy**

94UM0367D Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
16 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank Oleksandr Shcherbakov: "The Institute Becomes an Academy"]

[Text] The further reformation of the Sevastopol Naval Institute into the Naval Academy will occur by supplementing the already well-worked-out structure with newly created officers' classes and courses of study, as well as an academic section, SVMi Cadres Department Chief Captain 2nd Rank reports.

The further training or retraining of specialists, in cases where they are assigned to higher positions or in a case of changes in military hardware, will take place in the officers' classes and courses. The operational-tactical department will begin training the flag officer specialists so necessary to the Navy today.

This will provide an opportunity to combine under one roof the whole process of the selection, training and upbringing of specialists of all levels not only for the Navy, but for the Armed Forces of Ukraine and Minatomenergo [Ministry of Nuclear Power Engineering] as well.

The availability of the material and technical base and professorial and instructor personnel will make it possible to achieve this in the shortest possible time periods, and without substantial financial expenditures.

As concerns the first-year class of the Naval Institute—which was selected last year, proceeding from the Yalta agreements between the presidents of Russia and Ukraine on the Black Sea Fleet, on the basis of which the start of the creation of fleets of the two great Slavic nations was proposed—it will be cut back by roughly half. The best youth will be selected to continue their studies within the walls of the institute according to their rankings, which are affected by the level of success, discipline, health and physical training of the first-year cadets. The rest of the cadets will be offered studies at other military educational institutions of Ukraine. If they do not want that, they will finish the first year, receive academic certificates and be able to continue their studies at civilian higher educational institutions.

The new academic system is not only a self-contained cycle for the training of specialists, but will also provide an opportunity to preserve the material and technical base and the best personnel among the instructors.

#### **Ukraine's Position on Sevastopol Naval Base**

94UM0383A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
21 Apr 94 p 1

[Article by Serhiy Zhurets, NARODNA ARMIYA commentator, under the rubric "Point of View": "Is Sevastopol Not Doomed To Share the Fate of Guantanamo?"]

[Text] The meeting of the heads of state and heads of government of the CIS countries that was held in Moscow is now behind us. In terms of results, two aspects of the meeting will be of special significance to Ukraine.

The first is that Ukraine has joined the economic union as an associate member and signed all the economic agreements without exception—a fact that will significantly affect future relations with all the members of the CIS.

The second is the attempt to untie the "Black Sea knot," which primarily affects relations between Ukraine and Russia, which worsened following the incident in Odessa. Yet another agreement was reached in Moscow on the division of the Black Sea Fleet and on creating a Russian military base on Ukrainian territory.

What are Kiev's prospects in light of this second aspect following the Moscow meeting of the presidents of Ukraine and Russia? Let us turn to Leonid Kravchuk's own words. And so...

#### **Let us put it this way, what is ours and what is not ours?**

All the bases that are now located in Ukraine—Odessa, Ochakiv, Izmayil, etc.—are on our land and they are seemingly not at issue. As to ships, Ukraine will take as many as she requires to meet her military strategic needs as outlined in her military doctrine. (According to the Russian media, Ukraine lays claim to 15-20 percent of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet.)

#### **Where will the base of the Russian Navy be located?**

We will know in ten days' time. This matter is to be decided by a team of Ukrainian and Russian experts. Nonetheless, Leonid Kravchuk showed his hand, as he put it, saying that although it would be better not to locate this base in Sevastopol for patriotic reasons, it is necessary to reckon with realities. And the realities are that a significant portion of the Black Sea Fleet will be Russian, and if the base of the Russian fleet is located elsewhere, the Russian military will need to be provided with living quarters, their children with schools, and their wives with jobs. Given the financial capabilities of Ukraine, it is unlikely that these could be made available in another city.

#### **A Russian base on Ukrainian territory—is this to last forever?**

Based on what the president says, it is apparently only a matter of leasing, and leases have expiration dates. Consequently, the situation should not be dramatized.

#### **How much will the ships of the Black Sea Fleet, which will be handed over to Russia, cost, and what will be the price tag on the lease of Ukrainian territory to be used as a Russian military base?**

According to the president, the cost of these ships still needs to be added up. As far as the cost of the lease for basing Russian ships is concerned, there are international rules and principles for computing the price of such arrangements. We will not be inventing something new. We will propose whatever these calculations show the amount to be.

#### **What will be the status of this Russian base?**

After Ukraine takes her portion of ships from the Black Sea Fleet and Russia takes hers, we will immediately have Russian troops on Ukrainian territory, rather than the joint troops we had up to now. And once the troops are Russian, their status will need to be defined.

But the president's decision on this issue is not final. This decision has to be ratified by the Supreme Council.

...Let me explain that this is what the president thinks, but the final decision regarding the fate of the Russian base will depend, as Leonid Kravchuk noted, on the Supreme Council, whose present numerical composition does not allow it to pass legislation.

All of this is somewhat reminiscent of the second round at Massandra. That was the first occasion on which Leonid Kravchuk speculated about how profitable it would be for Ukraine to lease the Sevastopol naval base to Russia. That is also when the first calculations by independent experts appeared, in which the value of the Black Sea Fleet was assessed at 30 billion dollars. (It will be interesting to see what figure is presented this time.) After Massandra, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev declared the need for a military and political union between Moscow and Kiev.



But all that was in the past. Yet the fact that the problem of the Black Sea Fleet in the relations between Ukraine and Russia is being raised over and over again leads one to give the matter serious thought. These reflections indicate clearly that even after last week's meeting in Moscow of the presidents of Russia and Ukraine, it is premature to believe that this matter has finally been resolved. Is there anyone who still fails to understand that what is at stake is not only the fate of the Black Sea Fleet? Is there anyone who still fails to understand that behind the numerous recent promises by Russian leaders—both military and civilian—to protect Ukraine from all enemies from the south with an indivisible Black Sea Fleet, lies a defining of global military policy issues that are of extreme importance to Russia and which by no means exclude a military and political union between Moscow and Kiev, even though today this notion strikes us as absolutely impossible.

Yet who can say for certain today what will happen tomorrow? And is the creation of a Russian base on the territory of Ukraine a step that should be interpreted as giving in on a smaller issue in order to protect what is of greater importance? I do not know, I am not sure, especially as, unfortunately, we are drawing no lessons from the past. And yet, there was plenty to reflect upon: The outcome of the division of the foreign assets of the former USSR; the still standing decree of the Supreme Soviet of Russia (the soviet is gone, but the decree remains) on the status of Sevastopol; Russia's position with respect to nuclear disarmament in general and in the Odessa incident in particular, which both sides recognize as over, even though each side continues to believe its position to have been correct.

#### What next?..

Even before the ink had dried on the documents signed by the presidents in Moscow, a storm of accusations began to rage. The very next day after the signing of the agreement, Vyacheslav Kostikov, the Russian president's press secretary, issued a statement concerning the Ukrainian reaction to the signing of the agreement on dividing the Black Sea Fleet. It states that following the meeting on settling the problems of the Black Sea Fleet in stages, the Ukrainian side began to interpret this agreement in a one-sided manner. Even before the negotiations provided for by the agreement had begun, continues the statement, the Ukrainian side began to put forward its own formulas pertaining to the leasing, dates, and location for basing the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The Russian side is forced to remind [Ukraine] of the harsh realities and urgent tasks that constitute the basis of the signed agreement.

I was particularly struck by the assertion: "Reckless words and unbecoming acts with respect to something as sacred to the [Russian] nation as the Black Sea Fleet."

Thus, even before the experts on the Black Sea Fleet picked up their pencils and began their calculations, Vyacheslav Kostikov gave an appealing demonstration

that he is both efficient and knowledgeable. It is quite clear who is speaking through the press secretary. And when the Black Sea Fleet, which was no more than a fleet only yesterday, suddenly becomes "sacred to the Russian nation," we are well aware what arguments are used to defend and protect those things that are sacred to a nation. Thus the mention of harsh realities does not appear to be entirely out of place. This, however, leads to the inevitable conclusion that it is premature to speak of unravelling the "Black Sea knot" anytime soon, especially with the prospect of a foreign military base along the lines of Guantanamo appearing on Ukrainian soil.

#### Air Force Flight, Academic Training Explored

##### Importance of Zhytomyr Academy Noted

94UM0380B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
13 Apr 94 p 1

[NARODNA ARMIYA report: "An Expression of Appreciation to the Minister of Defense"]

[Text] Recently, General of the Army Vitaliy Radetskyy, the defense minister, received a letter from Mr. A. Malyonovskyy, the presidential representative in Zhytomyr Oblast.

Your assumption of the leadership of the defense ministry, states the letter, has ushered in important changes in the approach to building the Armed Forces of Ukraine. We are impressed by your energetic and consistent search for promising directions in the development of the Armed Forces, and, in particular, in reforming military education.

The latter is of particular concern to Zhytomyr residents, who are grateful to you for your attention to one of the oldest military schools, which has been located in Zhytomyr since 1946. On 8 December 1994, the school will celebrate its 75th anniversary. Since its establishment, it has trained more than 30,000 officers for the Air Defense Forces [PPO]. At present, the school, which is the only one of its kind, is training highly qualified specialists for the antimissile and space defense forces. We therefore feel that the decision to close the school is hasty and without sufficient grounds.

Being aware that you have given our problems your careful attention, we wish to express our deepest gratitude to you personally and to the entire leadership of the Ministry of Defense and express the hope that you will ultimately reach a positive decision regarding the fate of our school.

We believe that one way to decide this matter is to use the school as a base on which to create the military division of the Zhytomyr Missile and Space Engineering and Technological Institute [institut raketno-kosmichnoho profilyu] and a National Space Center. Proposals to this effect have been submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers. Taking into account your support of these proposals, we ask permission to begin enrolling



first-year students as soon as possible, thereby preventing the irreversible loss of the school's professors, instructors, and auxiliary teaching personnel—ends the letter from the presidential representative in Zhytomyr Oblast.

#### **Instructor Views Flight Training Problems**

94UM0380A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
20 Apr 94 p 2

[Article by H. Pryshchepa, instructor at the Department of Air Force Tactics at Chernihiv VVAUL [higher military aviation school for pilots], under the rubric "Reaction": "The L-39 Will Yet Prove Useful. Concerning Some Problems in Training Military Pilots"]

[Text] In articles devoted to issues associated with the building of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, NARODNA ARMIYA has often dealt with the urgent problem of flight personnel training. In particular, the article "How To Train Military Pilots," published on 9 December 1993, focused on the need to create a method system of instruction for students in military educational institution [vuz] and of additional training for officers and on the need to develop training and combat-training airplanes for this purpose. Continuing the discussion on this subject, an experienced professional offers an opportune suggestion.

We know that frontline aviation and the aviation of the Air Defense Forces [PPO] are currently in a very difficult situation due to the economic crisis in which our Ukraine now finds herself. Command headquarters is doing everything it can to make it possible for pilots to fly, but, unfortunately, it has very limited supplies of materials and equipment, fuel and lubricants, and its ability to replace aviation equipment is also limited. Nonetheless, there is a solution.

During this severe economic crisis, I propose using a new system requiring only modest expenditures for training young pilots for our Air Force and Air Defense Forces. The point of this system is to enable all flight school graduates to complete the new program in one and one-half to two years and attain the level of first-class grade using the L-39 training airplane. There are many of these planes in Ukraine, and the available number of them makes it possible to use them for this purpose for the next few years. The fact that these planes use small amounts of fuel will allow each pilot to accumulate from 80 to 100 flight hours per year.

In order to accomplish this purpose, a center for training fighter pilots first class, bomber pilots first class, and navigators first class could be created at the existing Chernihiv VVAUL, for example. The school offers a material base and a trained staff of pilots.

The most important elements in fighter pilot training are aerobatic flying [vyshchyy pilotazh], air combat with fighter airplanes, attacking ground targets involving simple and complex maneuvers, and flying by day and by night in clouds in poor weather. Can pilots not be

taught all this at low cost on the L-39's? Later, a pilot trained to this degree can be retrained at an already existing base (the same Chernihiv base) on a fighter plane with an additional 15-20 hours for pilot training and combat use of the new sighting mechanism, and the best of them can also be trained to serve as instructors.

There will be those who will say that the L-39 is not a MIG-20 nor a SU-25. I agree. But where are we to get the money to train pilots to achieve the rank of airman first class and airman second class on the MIG-29, which burns as much fuel in one flight as the L-39 during an entire flight shift? I am also relying on my own experience. I received my basic training on the MIG-21 BIS. I retrained on MIG-23's of almost all modifications, the MIG-29, and the SU-17MC without any difficulty and in a short period of time. I regard myself as a pilot with average skills, the kind that make up the majority in Ukraine and the world over. Even a three-year interval during which I did not fly while studying at the academy did not result in the loss of the skills I had acquired earlier.

A young officer coming to a unit after training in such a center will not be merely "personnel" ["shtatna odynytstva"]; he will be "combat personnel" ["boiova odynytstva"]. He will need only 25-30 hours of training on a combat airplane per year to retain his form and 20-30 hours on the same L-39. I see no better solution in the present difficult situation.

#### **Antonets Addresses Vinnytsya Conference**

94UM0380C Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Ukrainian  
20 Apr 94 p 1

[Air Force Press Center: "Directions To Be Taken in Building the Air Force Explored"]

[Text] A scientific-practical conference on "The Building and Use of the Air Force of Ukraine" was held on 18 April in Vinnytsya. In accordance with our country's Military Doctrine, the speakers focused their attention on the directions being taken in the build-up and use of this branch of the Armed Forces. They noted that the principal trend in the development of military aviation is to create mobile forces within the Air Defense Forces.

Air Force Lt. Gen. Volodymyr Antonets, commander of the Air Force of Ukraine, delivered a speech based on scientific argumentation. Among those taking an active part in the conference were commanders of air formations, chiefs of directorates and services of the Air Force Staff, leading officers-specialists, as well as representatives from the Air Defense Forces.

## CAUCASIAN STATES

**Georgian-Abkhazian Cease-Fire Agreement Reached**

94UM0377B Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
5 Apr 94 p 3

[Article by Pyotr Karapetryan: "Trip to America Unnecessary—Georgian-Abkhazian Agreements Signed in Moscow on April 4"]

[Text] An agreement on a cease-fire and the creation of conditions for the unimpeded return of refugees to Abkhazia was reached in the presence of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev. Experts agree that the development lays a good foundation for a settlement of the protracted conflict.

However, all this has happened in the past, and more than once. Where haven't agreements been signed—in Moscow,

Geneva, Sochi. Eduard Shevardnadze and Vladislav Ardzinba have gone to not only the Russian capital but also New York in search of truth. (Needless to say, each for his own version). Until they realized that they need not necessarily look for the road to domestic peace in some distant land. But this was pointed out even earlier at the CIS countries' interparliamentary assembly by Georgian parliamentary speaker Vakhtang Goguadze. He was one of the first to say that a solution to the Abkhaz problem hardly required a trip to America, that it should be solved within the CIS framework.

And so an understanding has been reached. There remains to hope that the parties to the conflict will move from declarations of accord to its implementation—against the backdrop, needless to say, of active mediation efforts by Russia and other CIS countries and United Nations assistance in the search for a peaceful solution.

## ARMS TRADE

### Decree on Arms-Related Export Controls

94SC0017A Moscow KOMMERSANT in Russian  
No 12, 5 Apr 94 p 58

[Decree Ratifying the Statute on the Procedure for Monitoring the Export From the Russian Federation of Certain Types of Raw and Processed Materials, Equipment, Technology, Scientific and Technical Information Which Can Be Used in the Production of Weapons or Military Equipment]

[Text] In accordance with Instruction No. 74-rp issued by the President of the Russian Federation on 11 February 1994, "On the Monitoring of Exports From the Russian Federation of Certain Types of Raw and Processed Materials, Equipment, Technology and Scientific and Technical Information Which Can Be Used in the Production of Weapons or Military Equipment, the Government of the Russian Federation hereby decrees the following:

1. It ratifies the proposed Statute on the Procedure for Monitoring Exports From the Russian Federation of Certain types of Raw and Processed Materials, Equipment, Technology and Scientific and Technical Information Which Could Be Used in the Production of Weapons or Military Equipment;
2. The Russian Federation's Commission on Export Controls under the Government of the Russian Federation, jointly with the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation and the State Customs Committee of the Russian Federation, is to set up control over exports from the Russian Federation of Certain Types of Raw and Processed Materials, Equipment, Technology and Scientific and Technical Information Which Can Be Used in the Production of Weapons or Military Equipment;
3. It acknowledges as out of force Decree No. 469 passed by the Government of the Russian Federation on 5 July 1992, "On Ratifying the List of Certain Raw and Processed Materials, Equipment, Technology and Scientific and Technical Information Used in the Production of Weapons or Military Equipment, the Export of which was Monitored and Effected Under License in 1992-1993." (SOBRANIYE AKTOV PREZIDENTA I PRAVITELSTVA RUSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII, No. 4, 1992, p 181).

V. Chernomyrdin  
Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation

### Statute on Arms-Related Export Controls

94SC0017B Moscow KOMMERSANT in Russian  
No 12, 5 Apr 94 pp 58-59

[Statute on Controls of Exports From the Russian Federation of Certain Types of Raw and Processed Materials, Equipment, Technology, Scientific and Technical

Information Which Can Be Used in the Production of Weapons or Military Equipment]

[Text]

1. This statute specifies a system of measures for monitoring the export of certain types of raw and processed materials, equipment, technology, scientific and technical information which can be used in the production of weapons or military equipment (hereafter referred to as dual-purpose goods and services).
2. The procedure for monitoring the export from the Russian Federation of dual-purpose goods and services requires the following:

—the preparation and issuance of conclusions on the possibility of exporting dual-purpose goods and services included on List No. 74-rp of Certain Types of Raw and Processed Materials, Equipment, Technology, Scientific and Technical Information Which Can Be Used in the Production of Weapons or Military Equipment the Export of Which is Monitored and Effected Under License (hereafter referred to as the List) ratified by order of the President of the Russian Federation on 11 February 1994;

—the licensing and drawing-up of customs accounts of dual-purpose goods and services.

3. All subjects of economic activities under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, regardless of form of ownership in the conclusion of contracts for export (transfer or exchange) of dual-purpose goods and services included on the List, must indicate in the text of the contract the end users and the purpose for which the exported goods and services are to be used, the commitment of the importer that such goods and services will be used only for purposes not directly or indirectly related to the production of weapons or military equipment and will not be reexported or transferred to anyone whomsoever without written orders to that effect from the exporter.

The obligations must be specially drawn up by the importer in an authorized state agency of the importing nation for each specific transaction for the delivery of any item of export included on the List in the form of an international (or national) import certificate or the like in the form of a document containing the obligations specified in the first paragraph of this point with a certified translation into Russian.

4. In the absence in the importing nation's legislation of standards governing the monitoring of exports of certain types of dual-purpose goods and services or the absence of a dual-purpose good or service imported from the Russian Federation on the national control list of the importing nation, an official document (notice) to that effect must be issued by an authorized state agency of the importing nation.

In this case the obligations of the importer contained in the text of the contract constitute an adequate basis for effecting the export. To the documents indicated is attached an extract from the commodity registry of the importing country or some other document confirming the legal status of the foreign importer according to the legislation of the nation in which he is located, with a certified translation into Russian.

The contract text must define the situation with respect to the exporter's right to verify that the good or service will be used in accordance with the stated purpose.

Setting up the monitoring of the obligations of foreign importers with respect to the use of dual-purpose goods or services imported from the Russian Federation is carried out by the procedure established in Decree No 1030 passed by the Council of Ministers and the Government of the Russian Federation on 11 October 1993.

If violations or nonobservance of the obligations are revealed during the verification, the contract is subject to abrogation.

5. The licensing of the export (transfer or exchange) of dual-purpose goods or services included on the List, is mandatory for all the subjects of economic activities within the Russian Federation and is performed for all types of foreign economic activities, regardless of the form of ownership, including direct production and scientific and technical relations, border and near-border trade, and commodity exchange operations, in accordance with this Statute.

The export (transfer or exchange) of dual-purpose goods and services included on the List is effected only under one-time licenses issued by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation.

The issuing of a license is based on a conclusion of the Commission for Export Control of the Russian Federation under the Government of the Russian Federation on the possibility of exporting (transferring or exchanging) dual-purpose goods or services.

A conclusion from the Commission on Export Control of the Government of the Russian Federation under the Ministry of Economics of the Russian Federation (Russia's Export Control) on the possibility of exporting (transferring or exchanging) dual-purpose goods or services constitutes the basis for issuing a license.

The following are submitted for obtaining a conclusion in the Ministry of Economics of the Russian Federation (export control department): A request for the issue of a licence drawn up in accordance with the requirements established by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation; a copy of the contract; a copy of the agreement between

the Russian producers and the exporter (when the export of the good or service is being effected through a middleman); the originals of documents describing the obligations of the importer (if they are not contained in the contract text) and the state agency of the importing nation as specified in points 3 and 4 of this Statute.

A conclusion on the possibility of export is valid for a period of no more than 20 days following the receipt of said documents. The conclusion is sent by the Ministry of Economics of the Russian Federation (the export control department) to the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation and the requester.

The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations of the Russian Federation sends information (in a coordinated form) on licenses based on conclusions of Russia's Export Control to the Ministry of Economics of the Russian Federation (export control department).

Permission to reexport is issued to Russian exporters based on a conclusion of Russia's Export Control on the possibility of reexporting. For this purpose the Russian exporter submits to the Ministry of Economics of the Russian Federation (the export control department) certified copies of the contract between the foreign importer and a third person containing the obligations stemming from the contract and drawn up in the authorized state agency of the country of the third person in the form of an import certificate or other document specified by its national legislation.

6. The temporary withdrawal beyond the borders of the Russian Federation of equipment (products), processed materials, technology, scientific and technical information contained on the List for showing at exhibits and fairs and for advertising purposes may be effected without a license based on conclusions of Russia's Export Control.

In order to acquire a conclusion on the possibility of temporary removal a request is submitted to the Ministry of Economics of the Russian Federation (export control department) containing the name of the item of export (indicating the TN VED [not further identified] code) and the quantity, the purpose of the removal and the way in which the object is to be used; the name of the exhibition (or fair); locations where the object will be used, periods during which the object removed will be kept abroad; name and address of Russian organization effecting the export; foreign contracting parties; the name of the customs agency which will draw up the customs forms on the object; and also the obligations of the Russian organization removing and returning the item.

A conclusion on the possibility of temporary removal is issued within a 20-day period following the receipt of said documents. The conclusion is sent by the Ministry of Economics of the Russian Federation (the



export control department) to the requester for submission to the customs agency indicated in the conclusion. A copy of the conclusion is sent to the State Customs Committee of the Russian Federation.

7. The removal of processed materials (items), equipment or technology containing information which is a state secret is effected in accordance with the Law of the Russian Federation "On State Secrets."
8. Customs documents must be drawn up by the established procedure on dual-purpose goods and services included on the List which are moved outside the borders of the Russian Federation.

The exporter submits the license obtained to the customs agencies, which serves as the basis for allowing the items to leave the borders of the Russian Federation.

In the case of temporary removal outside the borders of the Russian Federation of equipment (items), processed materials, technology, scientific and technical information included on the List for display at exhibitions and fairs and for advertising purposes, the customs agencies are provided with the conclusion of Russia's Export Control on the possibility of their temporary removal.

The State Customs Committee of the Russian Federation submits (in coordinated form) to the Ministry of Economics of the Russian Federation (export control department) information on the removal outside the borders of the Russian Federation of dual-purpose goods and services for which the conclusions and licenses indicated in points 5 and 6 of this Statute have been issued.

9. Persons exporting dual-purpose goods or services on which special export controls have been established in violation of the procedure specified by this Statute bear liability in accordance with legislation of the Russian Federation.

## DOCTRINAL ISSUES

### Tsygichko Calls for Development of New Military Doctrine

94UM0399A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 13 Apr 94 p 5

[Article by Vitaliy Tsygichko, professor, doctor of technical sciences, under rubric "Analysis": "What Kind of Army Do We Need?: On the Political Content of Russian Military Doctrine"]

[Text] The country's Armed Forces are a very important tool of national security, and so the most acute question at the current stage of creating a new Russian Army is what kind of army this should be, from whom and how it should defend us, what its goals and missions must be for the near

and far term, and in what direction structural perestroika of the Armed Forces will be accomplished in accordance with their new missions.

These questions must be answered by Russian military doctrine, the publication of which has been awaited impatiently both in Russia as well as abroad. The doctrine finally has been published and a broad discussion and interpretation of it is under way in the West, but this document's publication essentially has gone unnoticed by the mass media in our country. The article by Igor Serebryakov (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 8 February 1994) is an exception.

Inasmuch as Russian military doctrine is a reflection of our state's overall national goals and policy, then the new military policy of the United States and NATO, which is in the stage of formation, also will be built in accordance with this document.

An analysis of debates being conducted in NATO and the United States on the fundamentals of future military policy attests that a rather fierce struggle is going on between proponents of a policy from a position of strength, who stubbornly refuse to see the realities of the changed world on the assumption that the cold war has not yet ended, and proponents of an alliance with Russia as a future partner of the West that is extremely important politically, economically and militarily.

Depending on its content, Russian military doctrine can substantially reinforce the position of one side and largely determine the West's long-range economic and military policy toward Russia.

A very important foreign policy function of military doctrine is to create a new democratic image of Russia as a state friendly toward former ideological enemies and with common interests in maintaining international stability and peace. The doctrine's political content, which spells out the state's long-range strategy in the national security area, acts as practical confirmation of the country's proclaimed political course.

Of no less importance is military doctrine's internal state function, called upon to formulate principles and priorities in the building and functioning of the state's military system and to substantiate long-range military organizational development strategy, which takes into account real threats to the country's security and its economic capabilities.

Igor Serebryakov's analysis indicates that the published doctrine fulfills neither a foreign policy function nor an internal state function. It is difficult to disagree with this inasmuch as the doctrine does not answer to the substance of a single one of the questions posed above.

Let us refer to the political content of the military doctrine.

In the traditional understanding of this term, it is absent in the submitted text of the doctrine. The document proclaims only some very general principles of state

military policy irrespective of any kind of analysis of the real geopolitical situation and its development trends. Russia's place and interests in the new multipolar world are not considered; its attitude and long-range policy with respect to the former main enemy, the United States and NATO, are not defined; and the possibility of building collective security systems and of Russia's place in them is not evaluated. Without such an analysis, it is naturally impossible to indicate real and potential allies and enemies, predict threats and determine their directions and nature. All this means that there is no basis for developing fundamental doctrinal provisions such as an evaluation of theaters of possible wars and their presumed nature, likely forms and methods of warfare, possible participants of a conflict, and other provisions determining the real content of military policy and military organizational development as guides to practical activity in the national security area. Without these fundamental elements of military doctrine, the document that was submitted turned into a political declaration that is empty, but unfortunately far from safe for the country's interests.

The basic reason for the absence of a specific political content of the military doctrine unquestionably is the fact that until now there has been no document spelling out the country's long-range foreign policy course. This is connected above all with the absence of a legislatively incorporated Russian political doctrine reflecting the world and political outlook of the new state authority and its views on certain trends in world development and Russia's place in this process.

Military organizational development is a lengthy, sluggish and very costly process which cannot be oriented toward momentary interests of authorities and transient internal and external factors. In this context the authors' statement that this doctrine is a document for the transition period appears groundless at the very least. Provisions contained in doctrine are realized over decades, and so they must be based on a well grounded, long-range strategy comprising the foundation of state activity in the domestic and foreign policy area.

I am far from thinking that the military doctrine's developers do not realize everything said above. It is quite obvious that this document is strictly opportunistic and certain circles are using it in an attempt above all to incorporate a new domestic political function of the Armed Forces, i.e., that role which they played in the national tragedy of 3-4 October of last year. Another task is to obtain maximum possible funds and the freedom of choosing directions of military organizational development in the corporate interests of the military establishment.

The new military doctrine evoked bewilderment and great caution abroad, because of its vagueness. Many western experts interpret the lack of desire to express oneself clearly concerning relations with NATO, the United States, Japan and other power centers and the

absence of clearly formulated military policy priorities in the doctrine as an attempt to conceal its true goals and intentions.

The change in Russia's nuclear policy causes alarm. The principle of non-first use of nuclear weapons in any possible military conflict as proclaimed in the previous doctrine was replaced by a provision envisaging the possibility of delivering a preventive nuclear strike. This is perceived as a challenge and a veiled threat to the West. There is no doubt that the published document reinforces mistrust of the foreign policy course officially proclaimed by Russia and provides weighty arguments for our ill-wishers.

The circumstance that the military doctrine is equally suitable both for democrat Yeltsin and for extreme right nationalist Zhirinovskiy also causes concern. There is no trace of any kind of political orientation in it, and it would be naive to assume this is by chance. Legislative incorporation of the possibility of Army intervention in the country's internal affairs makes it a very important foreign policy factor that is potentially dangerous for incipient Russian democracy. The West sees this circumstance as evidence of political instability in the country and a result of the uncertainty of Russia's foreign policy course, which in itself represents a danger.

During the cold war years a persistent defensist mentality, presuming the presence of a constant danger of enemy attack, formed both in Russia and the West. When the ideological confrontation ended, the military both here in Russia and in the West began seeking new threats and is attempting to reanimate old ones.

The theory of multilateral strategic balance arose and now is being actively developed on this basis. That very same confrontation and the supposition that the one who has a military advantage can use military force to achieve its interests is the basis of this theory. The question of the substance of these interests and reasons for the possible appearance of contradictions which may lead to a wide-scale military clash or to world war is carefully avoided.

The presence of several opposing alliances or countries is presumed instead of the bilateral rivalry which faded into the past. Within the framework of such a model, each side naturally attempts to change the balance of forces in its own favor for purposes of greater security, chiefly by increasing military might, i.e., with the help of that very same arms race.

In other words, the new strategic stability model preserves old approaches inherent to the cold war period and again proposes a balance of power as a guarantee of security. Such a multilateral strategic balance model became the basis of Russia's new military doctrine, although it is quite obvious that this approach clearly contradicts the geopolitical situation which has been forming since the USSR's disintegration and contradicts the political course of the majority of states (including Russia), which proclaimed an aspiration for creating a

collective security system based on cooperation, not confrontation in the military area.

In my opinion, a fundamentally new document should be developed in place of the published text of military doctrine, free of the deficiencies examined above and unequivocally spelling out the strategy for ensuring Russia's national security and specific directions for military organizational development.

Above all, the doctrine's political content should be developed not in private, as has been the case up to now, but publicly, with the involvement of a wide circle of specialists and the interested public. It should register clearly the aim of military cooperation with the West as the general goal and long-range orientation of Russian military policy. It must be realized that Russia's general line toward integration into the world market economy cannot be implemented without striving for cooperation with the West in the military area.

This fundamental provision must steer the doctrine from a mythical danger on the part of the West to the real threats and possibly future threats to Russia's national interests and to its citizens. Today the main threat stems from political instability on former USSR territory and from militant nationalism and separatism. One also cannot forget the potential threat to our country in Asia and about protection of Russian interests in the Far East.

Russia's entry into the world economic community makes it a natural ally of the West in the defense of common interests, but this by no means signifies that Russia does not have its own national interests, which may not coincide with or may contradict those of other countries or blocs. As a great Euro-Asiatic power, Russia represents an important part of the world balance of forces, which ensures consideration of national and regional interests in a multipolar world. Russia's basic line toward friendly relations of partnership with the United States and NATO in the military-political and military-technical area and their joint actions in defense of common interests must not contradict the independence and interests of the Russian center of power. Russia's military might should give it not only a guarantee of security, but also conditions for equal participation in world affairs and an opportunity to defend its own national interests. The new military doctrine should take full account of a reasonable balance between common interests with the West and Russia's own interests. The question of the rational degree of Russia's military integration with the West, which meets the country's national interests and geopolitical status, also must be resolved in accordance with this balance.

Possible ways of building a collective security system with consideration of today's realities should be formulated from this standpoint. The Russian Army's place and sphere of possible responsibility in this system and a realistic program for adjusting military cooperation with former enemies, leading step by step to guaranteed mutual security, must be stated.

An aspect of military doctrine such as excluding Army influence on society's political life and turning it into a guarantor of internal stability and a reliable tool for protecting the democratic state system from external threat also is extremely urgent.

The possibility of Army intervention in the country's internal affairs should be excluded legislatively, and this provision should be reinforced by socioeconomic conditions of the Armed Forces existence. Restoring the Army's worthy position in Russian society is a very important means of accomplishing this priority task. No Russian democratic statehood will succeed in being built without this. In all times and eras, only when a good material situation was provided for officers and men was the Army a reliable support for state authority and did not intervene in politics.

If this condition is not fulfilled, if officers and men drag out a miserable existence and regular personnel are not sure of their future, which is not secured materially, then the Army is quickly politicized, turning into a dangerous political force inclined to support those who promise to improve its situation. Leaders of antidemocratic forces understand this full well and are taking advantage of the situation at hand for their political goals. They unfolded broad, pseudopatriotic propaganda for returning the status of a great military power to Russia, for a special antiwestern path of Russian development, and for a totalitarian, postcommunist form of state government capable of returning the past importance and social prestige to the Army. On the right flank of this movement stand such odious political figures as Zhirinovskiy, whose totalitarian ideas have support in the Army and in a considerable portion of the population.

The situation at hand is leading to the Army's moral decay and to a drop in discipline, reliability and combat effectiveness of troops. The best young officers are leaving the Army, which unquestionably will affect its future. There is no moral-political unity in the Army itself, nor can there be under the conditions at hand. Officer meetings have turned into political clubs, which contradicts the very essence of Army life and creates the real danger of Army intervention in politics. The deepening economic crisis and deterioration in the material situation of regular Army personnel objectively contribute to a growth in the number of proponents of rightist forces in its ranks. Doctrinal provisions allowing Army intervention in domestic political processes only exacerbate trends dangerous for our fragile democracy.

A return to a totalitarian form of government invariably will lead to reanimation of ideological confrontation with the West and to a new cold war. Russia's path to integration into the world economic community will be closed for a long time and a real danger of war will reappear.

Under conditions of international economic isolation there can be no mention of any kind of transition to a market economy, inasmuch as, rephrasing the familiar



cliché of Soviet propaganda, it is impossible to build capitalism in one individual country. It is quite obvious that such a prospect contradicts fundamental and most important national interests of the country and its citizens.

Under conditions of the economic crisis being experienced by the country and the rigid limitation of military expenditures connected with it, the most advisable way to preserve well supplied, combat effective Armed Forces dedicated to the regime is above all their sharp reduction to a level ensuring the most necessary security needs: security of borders, maintenance of combat readiness of minimum strategic nuclear forces, preservation of the necessary nucleus of branches of the Armed Forces, and creation of small rapid reaction forces based on the most combat effective formations of ground troops. In the military-political situation at hand, Russia can fully perform missions of defense by having an Army of no more than one million persons. A new system of the country's mobilization preparation should serve as a guarantee of security under conditions of a sharp reduction in the Armed Forces.

The new military doctrine could incorporate the proposed numerical strength of the Armed Forces as one of the goals of military reform and thereby facilitate a solution both to political and economic problems of the country.

A radical reduction in the Army is a complex, lengthy, painful process engendering a multitude of social problems. Great material expenditures, connected above all with provision of housing, pay and work to the officers and warrant officers being discharged, are needed to resolve these problems. But these are necessary social costs which must be undertaken for the sake of preserving political stability and future economic advantages of military reform. If the government and parliament will not undertake these expenditures, they may lose control over processes occurring in the Army, and this can have catastrophic political consequences.

The problem of manpower acquisition also will disappear with a reduction in the Army, when it will be possible to call up only literate, cultured young people wishing to serve in the Armed Forces.

A small Russian Army will be fully capable of beginning a gradual transition to professional principles of manpower acquisition on a contract basis, which will permit a considerable increase in its combat capabilities, political attitude and morale.

Such an Army will be a reliable support for Russia's democratic statehood and will be capable of reliably protecting the country's interests.

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